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ABSTRACT—The ability of social media companies to precisely target 
advertisements to individual users based on those users’ characteristics is 
changing how job opportunities are advertised. Companies like Facebook 
use machine learning to place their ads, and machine learning systems 
present risks of discrimination, which current legal doctrines are not 
designed to deal with. This Note will explain why it is difficult to ensure 
such systems do not learn discriminatory functions and why it is hard to 
discern what they have learned as long as they appear to be performing well 
on their assigned task. This Note then shows how litigation might adapt to 
these new systems to provide a remedy to individual plaintiffs but explains 
why deterrence is ill-suited in this context to prevent this discrimination from 
occurring in the first place. Preventing machine learning systems from 
learning to discriminate requires training those systems on broad, 
representative datasets that include protected characteristics—data that the 
corporations training these systems may not have. The Note proposes a 
proactive solution, which would involve a third party safeguarding a rich, 
large, nationally representative dataset of real people’s information. This 
third party could allow corporations like Facebook to train their machine 
learning systems on a representative dataset, while keeping the private data 
themselves out of those corporations’ hands. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2015, Google launched Google Photos, a free service that 
allowed users to upload unlimited numbers of pictures and later search 
through those images using words.1 Google Photos automatically tags each 
picture with words describing its content based on predictions generated by 
Google’s artificial intelligence image analysis system.2 But barely a month 
after rolling out its new service, Google suffered a major public 
embarrassment when a user discovered that Google Photos had labeled 
images of black people as “gorillas.”3 Google immediately apologized and 
 
 1 Google Photos, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/photos/about [https://perma.cc/F5ZD-MQGD]. 
 2 Devon Delfino, ‘How Does Google Photos Work?’: Everything You Need to Know About Google's 
Photo Storage App for IPhone and Android, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2019, 5:25 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-does-google-photos-work [https://perma.cc/A6DM-L3EL]. 
 3 Conor Dougherty, Google Photos Mistakenly Labels Black People ‘Gorillas’, N.Y. TIMES: BITS 
BLOG (July 1, 2015, 7:01 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/google-photos-mistakenly-
labels-black-people-gorillas [https://perma.cc/WAC2-57T4]. 
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promised to fix the problem, and yet, years later, its solution still has not 
advanced from simply preventing its software from tagging any image as 
containing a gorilla.4 Apparently, Google could not find a solution to reliably 
prevent such racist image mislabeling to occur.5 
The world has entered a new era of big data and machine learning, 
where more and more decisions are being made based on patterns 
algorithmically extracted from large datasets.6 Machine learning systems 
ingest large amounts of data and learn to make predictions about some 
element of interest (e.g., a label for an image) based on that data (e.g., 
attributes of the image itself).7 If these datasets encode the biases of the 
humans generating the datasets, then machine learning systems trained on 
those datasets are likely to replicate those biases or even introduce new 
biases based on patterns that happen to be present in those data.8 But because 
machine learning systems are not easily inspected or explained,9 such biases 
may pass largely undetected. 
Big data and machine learning have already transformed advertising. 
The old model of advertising based on newspapers, billboards, and television 
is declining in favor of a model in which consumers see ads online, such as 
on Google and Facebook.10 Companies are now recruiting employees by 
 
 4 Tom Simonite, When It Comes to Gorillas, Google Photos Remains Blind, WIRED (Jan. 11,  
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/when-it-comes-to-gorillas-google-photos-remains-blind 
[https://perma.cc/T27M-8SG9]. 
 5 In this instance, a Google engineer attributed the source of the error to two problems: the general 
difficulty of facial recognition and the fact that cameras have long been calibrated to produce higher-
quality photos of white people than nonwhite people, which in turn provides worse inputs to facial 
recognition systems for nonwhite people. See Yonatan Zunger, Asking the Right Questions About AI, 
MEDIUM (Oct. 11, 2017), https://medium.com/@yonatanzunger/asking-the-right-questions-about-ai-
7ed2d9820c48 [https://perma.cc/D8W8-8A3N]. 
 6 See, e.g., Editorial, How Artificial Intelligence Is Edging Its Way into Our Lives, N.Y. TIMES  
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/technology/artificial-intelligence-new-work-
summit.html [https://perma.cc/XBV5-Q92H]. 
 7 Tom M. Mitchell, Does Machine Learning Really Work?, 18 AI MAG. 11, 11–13 (1997). 
 8 Will Knight, Biased Algorithms Are Everywhere, and No One Seems to Care, MIT TECH. REV. 
(July 12, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608248/biased-algorithms-are-everywhere-and-
no-one-seems-to-care [https://perma.cc/3P5J-9LAH]; see also Zunger, supra note 5 (explaining that a 
Google Image search for “‘[t]hree white teenagers’ turned up stock photography of attractive, athletic 
teens; [while] ‘three black teenagers’ turned up mug shots, from news stories about three black teenagers 
being arrested. [This outcome was not due to] a bias in Google’s algorithms: it was a bias in the underlying 
data[,] . . . a combination of ‘invisible whiteness’ and media bias in reporting.”). 
 9 See infra Section I.C. 
 10 See, e.g., Hamza Shaban, Digital Advertising to Surpass Print and TV for the First Time, Report 
Says, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/02/20/digital-
advertising-surpass-print-tv-first-time-report-says [https://perma.cc/S9E4-V4GH] (reporting forecasts by 
EMarketer). 
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advertising job opportunities through social media, a practice that will likely 
become more and more commonplace.11 The old advertising model may have 
targeted a general audience, but the new advertising model targets individual 
users with extreme precision. 
As social media websites increasingly become platforms for employee 
recruitment, the mechanisms through which they target job ads to users or 
allow employers to request that those ads be targeted have faced growing 
scrutiny. Facebook, for example, has over a billion users and makes money 
by promising advertisers it will show their ads to users likely to click them.12 
Thus, its business depends on its ability to effectively target specific ads to 
individual users. Doing this manually would take a global army of 
employees, who would not necessarily be effective. Instead, Facebook uses 
machine learning technology to predict which kinds of ads particular users 
might click.13 
Though it is illegal to target job ads using statutorily defined protected 
characteristics (such as sex, race, age, and others),14 Facebook has recently 
faced criticism and legal action for targeting such ads in these exact ways.15 
 
 11 Though rigorous empirical research on this claim is currently lacking, there is consensus among 
job candidate recruitment organizations that this is the case. See, e.g., JOBVITE, JOBVITE RECRUITER 
NATION REPORT 2016: THE ANNUAL SOCIAL RECRUITING SURVEY 14 (2016) (showing both recruiters 
and job seekers use social media to find and vet candidates). 
 12 Ben Gilbert, How Facebook Makes Money from Your Data, in Mark Zuckerberg’s Words, BUS. 
INSIDER (Apr. 11, 2018, 10:25 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-facebook-makes-money-
according-to-mark-zuckerberg-2018-4 [https://perma.cc/MM6D-MLM7]. 
 13 Machine Learning, FACEBOOK: RESEARCH, https://research.fb.com/category/machine-learning 
[https://perma.cc/PN8E-PPMQ]. 
 14 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e)(17) (2012). Indeed, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission recently found reasonable cause to believe that several employers 
violated Title VII by placing job ads on Facebook and directing that the ads not be shown to women or 
older users. See In Historic Decision on Digital Bias, EEOC Finds Employers Violated Federal Law 
When They Excluded Women and Older Workers from Facebook Job Ads, ACLU (Sep. 25, 2019), 
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/historic-decision-digital-bias-eeoc-finds-employers-violated-
federal-law-when-they [https://perma.cc/VTT2-JM6X]. For copies of the letters themselves, see U.S. 
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Letters of Determination (July 5, 2019), available at 
https://www.onlineagediscrimination.com/sites/default/files/documents/eeoc-determinations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4LNE-F3N5]. 
 15 Julia Angwin & Terry Parris Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA 
(Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-exclude-users-
by-race [https://perma.cc/G53V-A63F]; Julia Angwin et al., Facebook Job Ads Raise Concerns About 
Age Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/business/ 
facebook-job-ads.html [https://perma.cc/K4LX-XV5Y]; Noam Scheiber, Facebook Accused of Allowing 
Bias Against Women in Job Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/ 
business/economy/facebook-job-ads.html [https://perma.cc/AU28-5C7D]. The ACLU’s complaint in its 
lawsuit against Facebook can be found at Facebook EEOC Complaint—Charge of Discrimination, ACLU 
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Indeed, Facebook recently settled several such lawsuits, agreeing to change 
the way housing, employment, and credit ads can be targeted to its users.16 
Yet, as this Note will demonstrate, these changes may be insufficient to 
prevent discrimination. 
Furthermore, Facebook is not the only company at risk of 
discriminating through its use of machine learning systems. Other social 
media and online advertising companies, such as Google, Twitter, and 
LinkedIn, will be susceptible to similar claims to the extent they use machine 
learning to target advertisements. Although these issues can involve 
discrimination along any characteristic protected by Title VII,17 this Note 
specifically focuses on sex discrimination and on Facebook’s employment 
advertising algorithms. 
The new era of online employment advertising and machine learning is 
in fundamental tension with Title VII because Title VII is not designed to 
deal with the ways in which machine learning systems might discriminate. 
The law must therefore adapt to the ways discrimination will manifest 
through such systems.18 Indeed, in the context of employment, scholars have 
already begun to examine how Title VII might be amended to eliminate 
obstacles faced by those alleging discrimination in companies’ online 
recruiting efforts.19 But this Note will explain why eliminating bias in 
machine learning systems requires a proactive rather than reactive response: 
these systems must learn to avoid discrimination as they are developed and 
before they are deployed, and the threat of litigation may not suffice to ensure 
this occurs effectively. 
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I discusses digital advertising and 
machine learning, explaining the basics of how deep learning neural network 
algorithms work and the challenges involved in understanding what they 
have learned. Part II describes the requirements employment discrimination 
laws place on those who advertise employment opportunities and how people 
can challenge violations of these laws. Part III explains why current doctrine 
 
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/facebook-eeoc-complaint-charge-discrimination 
[https://perma.cc/4PMM-WBJ2] [hereinafter “Complaint”]. 
 16 See Summary of Settlements Between Civil Rights Advocates and Facebook, ACLU  
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/other/summary-settlements-between-civil-rights-advocates-and-
facebook [https://perma.cc/U4MY-7GUW] [hereinafter “Settlement”]. Notwithstanding the settlement of 
several of these cases, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is continuing to pursue 
a lawsuit against Facebook over its discriminatory housing advertising practices. Facebook, No. 01-18-
0323-8, (DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV. Charge of Discrimination Mar. 28, 2019), https://www. 
hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/HUD_v_Facebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SH6-6KNE]. 
17 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012), forbids employment 
discrimination along certain characteristics. See infra Section II.B. 
 18 See infra Part III. 
 19 See infra Part III. 
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is ill-equipped to deal with the challenges posed by modern machine learning 
technology, addresses the pros and cons of proposed solutions to these 
challenges, and examines potential adaptations to existing doctrine that may 
support claims of algorithmic advertising discrimination. Part IV then 
explains why providing recourse for individual plaintiffs is insufficient to 
prevent advertising discrimination from occurring in the first place. This Part 
instead proposes a proactive legal mechanism to prevent such 
discrimination: entrusting a third party (such as a new government agency, a 
nonprofit organization, or some other entity) with a diverse and 
representative dataset of real people’s data. By allowing systems engineers, 
like Facebook, to train their systems on these data, this entity would give 
those engineers the best chance possible to avoid building discriminatory 
systems and would be able to evaluate the extent to which those systems 
discriminate, all while maintaining the privacy and integrity of people’s data. 
I. FRONTIERS IN DIGITAL EMPLOYMENT ADVERTISING 
Systems such as Facebook’s ad-placement algorithm are likely to 
operate in a discriminatory fashion unless steps are actively taken to prevent 
them from doing so, both because of the tools Facebook makes available to 
advertisers and because of the general principles underlying big data 
machine learning technology. This Part describes social media ad-placement 
methods and shows why they may result in discriminatory outcomes, from 
the easiest-to-recognize form of discriminatory targeting to the most 
insidious. It describes how user data can be used as proxies for sensitive 
information (like sex). It then explains how machine learning systems can 
discern and rely upon such sensitive information through combinations of 
otherwise innocuous characteristics. Finally, it describes emergent 
techniques that can help mitigate these risks. 
A. Using Explicit Proxy Variables 
Up until its recent settlement, Facebook required advertisers to specify 
the gender of users to whom the ad will be shown (“Male,” “Female,” or 
“All”).20 The settlement prohibits such explicit targeting, as well as targeting 
ads based on data that serve as direct proxies for protected characteristics 
(meaning they can be used to target particular genders, races, etc.).21 For 
example, Facebook will no longer allow advertisers to target users who 
 
 20 Complaint, supra note 15, at 1. 
 21 Settlement, supra note 16, at 1. 
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reside within a mile of a particular address or within a specific zip code.22 By 
specifying addresses in homogenous areas and setting small radii, advertisers 
had been able to create target audiences along a protected characteristic 
without ever specifying that characteristic—a familiar callback to historical 
redlining practices.23 
But although advertisers can no longer use precise location information 
to target employment, housing, or credit ads, Facebook still allows targeting 
based on users’ interests, which may be proxies for protected 
characteristics.24 At least prior to Facebook’s settlement, Facebook’s ad 
targeting system could be used to create audiences homogenous along a 
protected characteristic, which therefore discriminated by excluding those 
without that characteristic.25 For example, targeting an ad at users interested 
in the brand “Marie Claire” generated an audience that was 90% female.26 
If an employer is seeking a cosmetics salesperson, then targeting job 
ads towards an interest in cosmetics is legitimate. But if these variables are 
being used only as proxies for protected characteristics, they might run afoul 
of antidiscrimination law.27 It may be possible to identify individual variables 
that are proxies for protected characteristics and forbid their use in targeting 
job ads. Indeed, Facebook’s settlement promises that Facebook will identify 
and forbid the use of such proxy variables.28 There may be variables, 
 
 22 Id. 
 23 See, e.g., NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992) (“‘Redlining’ 
is charging higher rates or declining to write insurance for people who live in particular areas [, and that 
can be discriminatory] when insurers draw their lines around areas that have large or growing minority 
populations.”). 
 24 The Settlement indicates that housing, employment, and credit ads can no longer be targeted using 
characteristics that “appear to be related to personal characteristics or classes protected under anti-
discrimination laws.” Settlement, supra note 16, at 1. The Settlement does not indicate who will determine 
whether an interest acts as such a proxy, or how. Id. 
 25 Till Speicher et al., Potential for Discrimination in Online Targeted Advertising, 81 PROC. 
MACHINE LEARNING RES. (CONF. ON FAIRNESS ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY) 1, 8–9 (2018). 
These researchers also identified proxy variables and interests that tracked with or excluded specific races, 
sexual orientations, and religions, and which could therefore be used to either target ads to users along 
those lines or prevent members of particular groups from seeing such ads. Id. 
 26 Id. Note that the claim is not that 90% of women are interested in the brand Marie Claire, but that 
targeting an ad on the basis of such an interest will be effective at excluding men from the target group. 
Id. 
 27 Title VII does allow that protected characteristics like race, sex, religion, etc., may be used if they 
are in fact employment qualifications. See infra Part II. 
 28 See Settlement, supra note 16, at 1 (“[Housing, employment, and credit] ads will not have targeting 
options that describe or appear to be related to personal characteristics or classes protected under anti-
discrimination laws.”). The settlement does not specify how this will occur; that is, whether Facebook 
will assess whether a variable is a proxy for a protected characteristic as used on an ad-by-ad basis or 
only whether that variable globally acts as a proxy variable. Some personal attributes, like interests, may 
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however, that do not by themselves act as proxies for protected 
characteristics but do so in conjunction with other variables.29 
B. Lookalike Audiences 
“People just like your customers are waiting to hear from you,” 
announces Facebook’s page on lookalike audiences.30 Lookalike audiences 
allow advertisers to provide Facebook with a list of people the advertiser 
knows it wants to target and, in turn, have Facebook target other people who 
look like those users.31 Under the terms of the settlement, the lookalike tool 
will not use characteristics protected by Title VII to expand audiences for 
job ads.32 But even if Facebook blocks its lookalike tool from picking 
audiences based on protected characteristics or their proxies, what if a 
protected characteristic emerges through a combination of otherwise non-
proxy variables? That is, what if that characteristic is encoded through 
several variables, not just one? Being between ages eighteen and twenty-two 
is not a proxy for gender, nor is living near the Smith College campus, as 
Northampton, Massachusetts is not an all-women’s town. But being between 
ages eighteen and twenty-two and living near Smith College, an all-women’s 
school, may be highly correlated with gender.33 In that scenario, if you run a 
pizzeria in Northampton with a mostly student clientele and you want to 
target job ads to people like the visitors to your website, your audience may 
skew towards women, without the ad being explicitly targeted on the basis 
of sex. 
 
not alone act as a proxy for a protected characteristic, but may do so in a particular region, or in 
conjunction with other attributes. See infra Section I.C. 
 29 See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 681, 685 (2017) 
(“Blindness to a sensitive attribute has long been recognized as an insufficient approach to making a 
process fair. The excluded or ‘protected’ attributes can often be implicit in other nonexcluded 
attributes.”). 
 30 Lookalike Audiences, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/learn/facebook-ads-
lookalike-audiences [https://perma.cc/Y3WT-2AU8]. 
 31 Id. The source users might be a client list, or visitors to some website the advertiser controls. Id. 
Advertisers can leave it in Facebook’s hands who to target using that audience list, can  
specify characteristics with which to define what a “lookalike” user is, and can specify to Facebook  
how similar the lookalike audience should be to the source audience. Facebook Advertising  
Targeting Options, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/a/facebook-ads-targeting-tips 
[https://perma.cc/9PVY-YV2R]. 
 32 Settlement, supra note 16, at 1–2. Facebook will not allow any targeting along legally protected 
characteristics for housing, employment, or credit ads, not just characteristics protected under Title VII. 
Id. at 1. The fact that Facebook now promises not to let its lookalike audience tool to rely on protected 
characteristics may suggest that the tool could previously do so. 
 33 It is unknown whether these features, taken together, do in fact predict gender; this is meant only 
for illustrative purposes. 
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But what if the restaurant now wants to open a location in Amherst, 
Massachusetts? Amherst is also a college town, but the local schools are 
mixed-gender, so the potential student worker population is now more 
gender-neutral. If the restaurant provides Facebook’s lookalike audience tool 
the group of mostly young women from Northampton, that population will 
no longer represent the underlying local population in Amherst. The 
previously innocuous gender imbalance may thus turn into a biasing factor, 
even without gender being explicitly relied upon. Accordingly, whether an 
audience is discriminatory along some characteristic may turn on nothing 
more than the demographics of the place the ad is shown. 
It is thus not enough to preclude expanding the audience based on age 
or gender when other characteristics can both serve as such proxies and form 
the basis for expanding the audience. This problem points to the most 
pernicious problem—pernicious not for any malicious intent, but because the 
problem is difficult to recognize or correct once it has been introduced. This 
is the problem of algorithmic bias in machine learning systems. 
C. Algorithmic Bias in Machine Learning Systems 
The greatest challenges for employment discrimination doctrine 
relating to online job ads stem from issues involving machine learning. 
Machine learning (ML) refers to a class of artificial intelligence approaches 
that involve feeding data (often millions of datapoints) into a computer 
algorithm, which extracts information used to make predictions about similar 
data.34 ML systems learn functions that, given some input data (e.g., 
information Facebook has about a user), output some value (e.g., whether 
she should be shown a particular advertisement). ML has recently seen rapid 
advancements in many domains, including image labeling and visual scene 
analysis, language translation, artistic creativity, medical diagnosis, and 
 
 34 Mitchell, supra note 7, at 11–12. 
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games.35 Facebook already uses ML to determine which ads to show to 
whom.36 
This Section will explain how certain ML approaches yield black-box 
functions, such that a user (or the system’s engineers) cannot understand how 
its output was derived from the inputs.37 It will show that although there may 
be many functions that could generate that output from the inputs, the system 
will only have learned one.38 Because the systems are black boxes, they can 
only be evaluated by their performance upon data to which they have been 
exposed so far, which may not be representative of all the data upon which 
the system will eventually operate. These systems might learn impermissibly 
discriminatory functions, making predictions on the basis of complex 
combinations of factors that together act as proxies for protected 
characteristics. The rest of this Part is concerned with explaining why this 
process happens, and what, so far, can be done about it. 
Understanding why algorithmic bias occurs requires understanding 
certain aspects of ML systems’ functionality. To begin with, ML systems do 
not see data the way humans do. Generally, data are input into ML systems 
as feature vectors, which are essentially a list of qualities describing each 
datum.39 Whoever assembles the dataset determines those qualities that 
describe every piece of data in the dataset. For example, a dataset of simple 
geometric objects might describe each object in terms of their shape, size, 
and color: a large red circle would be represented as [shape: circle; size: 
 
 35 See, e.g., Andrej Karpathy & Li Fei-Fei, Deep Visual-Semantic Alignments for Generating Image 
Descriptions, 39 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PATTERN ANALYSIS & MACHINE INTELL. 664, 664 (2017) 
(image labeling); Dzmitry Bahdanau et al., Neural Machine Translation by Jointly  
Learning to Align and Translate, ARXIV (May 19, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1409.0473.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S3RQ-ZHWC] (machine translation); Hannu Toivonen & Oskar Gross, Data Mining 
and Machine Learning in Computational Creativity, 5 WILEY INTERDISC. REVS.: DATA MINING & 
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 265 (2015) (computational creativity); David Ferrucci et al., Watson: Beyond 
Jeopardy!, 199 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 93, 95 (2013) (describing how IBM Watson can be used in the 
healthcare domain); David Ferrucci et al., Building Watson: An Overview of the DeepQA Project, 
31 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MAG. 59, 60 (2010) (describing how the IBM Watson Team built the 
system that was able to win Jeopardy!); David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go Without Human 
Knowledge, 550 NATURE 354 (2017) (describing the system that beat the world-champion, human player 
of the game Go); Matej Moravčík et al., DeepStack: Expert-Level Artificial Intelligence in Heads-Up No-
Limit Poker, 356 SCIENCE 508 (2017) (describing a system that could beat human, professional, no-limit 
Texas Hold’em poker players). 
 36 FACEBOOK, Machine Learning, supra note 13. 
 37 See infra Section I.C.1. 
 38 See infra Section I.C.1. 
 39 See Hannah Pang et al., Feature Vector, BRILLIANT, https://brilliant.org/wiki/feature-vector 
[https://perma.cc/NYN7-GEFV] (“A vector is a series of numbers . . . . A feature is a numerical or 
symbolic property of an aspect of an object. A feature vector is a vector containing multiple elements 
about an object.”). 
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large; color: red], while a small blue square would be [shape: square; size: 
small; color: blue]. For a feature vector based on a social network profile, 
then, an individual will be represented as the set of the qualities that user has 
provided to the company and other qualities the company has gleaned about 
the user,40 and the absence of such features.41 
ML systems use these feature vectors to predict information of interest 
to them. Usually, the ML algorithm will use all but one of the features to 
predict the remaining one. In the simple-geometric-shapes example, a system 
might learn to predict an object’s color given its shape and size. For a more 
real-world example, by taking pictures of an individual and adding them to 
a dataset of images of other people, an ML system can be trained to predict 
whether the first person is pictured in the other images.42 
The class of ML techniques that have recently received the most 
attention, for underlying many recent advances, are “neural networks,” 
specifically deep learning neural networks (DLNNs).43 
 
 40 Importantly, this claim about the representations used by social media companies is speculation—
the feature vectors and indeed algorithms used by social media corporations are trade secrets and have 
not been inspected for this Note. If the assumption is correct, however, a social network’s feature vector 
for a person may include information such as [Sex (0=male, 1=female, 2=nonbinary), age, from-USA, 
likes-coffee, . . . ], so that a twenty-two-year-old Canadian woman who likes coffee (among other things) 
would be represented as [1, 22, 0, 1, . . . ]. However, this is for illustrative purposes only, and likely bears 
little surface resemblance to the feature vectors used to represent individuals in systems such as the ones 
used by Facebook and other social networks. 
 41 Machine learning systems need every feature in every vector they might use to be filled for every 
training datapoint; if those data are missing for an individual, they must either be treated as implicitly 
absent, or at least unknown. See, e.g., IAN H. WITTEN ET AL., DATA MINING: PRACTICAL MACHINE 
LEARNING TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 62 (4th ed. 2017). So in the previous example, if researchers do not 
know whether someone likes coffee or not, they can either assume they do not and assign them a 0, 
assume they do and assign them a 1, do either of those things according to some probabilistic formula, or 
assign some “unknown” or “neutral” variable (like 0.5). 
 42 See, e.g., Sidney Fussell, Facebook’s New Face Recognition Features: What We Do (and Don’t) 
Know, GIZMODO (Feb. 27, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://gizmodo.com/facebooks-new-face-recognition-
features-what-we-do-an-1823359911 [https://perma.cc/GS3R-TFE6]. These algorithms are not actually 
this simplistic—there is not a separate system trained to recognize each individual person. Instead, the 
algorithm will have an output variable for all, or nearly all, people whose faces it learns to predict, will 
assign each of those a probability based on the extent to which the system thinks that person is the person 
pictured, and will label the picture based on the highest-probability output. This approach to prediction is 
known as One Hot Encoding, see Using Categorical Data with One Hot Encoding, KAGGLE, 
https://www.kaggle.com/dansbecker/using-categorical-data-with-one-hot-encoding 
[https://perma.cc/8NFB-JBWG]. 
 43 See Yann LeCun et al., Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436, 436–38 (2015). This Note focuses on 
DLNNs due to their widespread use and the attention they have recently received. 
 There are certainly other classes of ML algorithms that are similarly widely used, some even more 
than DLNNs for certain kinds of tasks. Reinforcement learning in particular has received a lot of attention 
recently for its use in robotics. See generally Jens Kober et al., Reinforcement Learning in Robotics: A 
Survey, 32 INT’L J. ROBOTICS RES. 1238 (2013) (surveying the work of reinforcement learning for 
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1. Basic Principles of Deep Learning Neural Networks 
Neural networks are a kind of ML algorithm that learn to map inputs to 
outputs based on mathematical relationships extracted from the input data. 
They are so called because they draw inspiration from the connectivity of 
neural structures in the brain.44 Neural networks are made up of units, or 
nodes in a graph, and weights, the edges connecting those nodes.45 They take 
a feature vector as their input layer of units; these inputs are transformed as 
they are passed through the network until they reach the output layer, which 
gives the values to be predicted. Between the input and output layers are one 
or more hidden layers (Figure 1).46 Deep learning works by extracting 
meaningful information from the connections between low-level features, 
and the connections between those connections. 
 
behavior generation in robots). Reinforcement learning is used to learn appropriate actions to take in 
given states across time, rather than classification tasks based on large standardized datasets. Id. at 1238–
39. It also featured in game-playing systems of the kind that recently beat the world champion in the game 
Go. See David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks and Tree Search, 
529 NATURE 484, 485–86 (2016). 
 Many machine learning techniques are more easily interpreted than neural network models. For 
example, one of the oldest ML techniques, nearest neighbor, makes a prediction for an input by finding 
one or more most-similar examples it already knows about and outputting the same prediction; this naïve 
algorithm is easily interpretable by examining the similarity function and the neighbors the algorithm 
returns. See T. M. Cover & P. E. Hart, Nearest Neighbor Pattern Classification, 13 IEEE TRANSACTIONS 
ON INFO. THEORY 21, 22 (1967). Another technique, support vector machines, find multidimensional 
planes to separate data into categories in a way that can sometimes be graphed and interpreted by humans. 
See generally Chih-Wei Hsu & Chih-Jen Lin, A Comparison of Methods for Multiclass Support Vector 
Machines, 13 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NEURAL NETWORKS 415 (2002). Another area that has been 
extremely fruitful recently is Bayesian probabilistic modeling. See generally Zoubin Ghahramani, 
Probabilistic Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence, 521 NATURE 452 (2015). Bayesian modeling 
can find hierarchical structures (including causal structures) that shape a dataset. Id. at 458. The challenge 
with Bayesian modeling is that it is computationally expensive to find the factors that are actually relevant 
and requires a thorough, representative dataset that captures those factors. Id. at 456. Another relatively 
old machine learning technique that continues to be fruitful and relevant today is the genetic algorithm. 
See generally HANDBOOK OF GENETIC ALGORITHMS (Lawrence Davis ed., 1991). Genetic algorithms 
generate multiple solutions to problems or to achieve some task, measure how well those systems perform 
at the task, then take the best solutions and cross them together to “breed” a new generation of solutions, 
continuing the cycle until they arrive at the best solution. Id. at 1. 
 Many ML achievements in recent years (including AlphaGo, the system that is now the world 
champion at Go, and DeepStack and Libratus, which are champion-level Texas Hold’em Poker-playing 
systems) use a combination of several different kinds of algorithms for different subtasks involved in 
their overall functionality. All of these systems face difficulties with causal explanation of the models 
they construct, with Bayesian models generally being the most interpretable and neural networks being 
the least.  
44 See, e.g., Larry Hardesty, Explained: Neural Networks, MIT NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017), http:// 
news.mit.edu/2017/explained-neural-networks-deep-learning-0414 [https://perma.cc/VA56-D4EQ]. 
 45 See LeCun et al., supra note 43, at 436–37. 
 46 Id. at 438. 
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FIGURE 1: A BASIC DEEP LEARNING NEURAL NET ARCHITECTURE47 
 
In Figure 1, the white nodes on the left are the input data, and the left-
most layer of light gray nodes encode relationships that can exist between 
the input data. The middle set of light gray nodes encode relationships 
between the left-most layer of light gray nodes, and so on. So at each level, 
the DLNN is discerning meaningful relationships between the things at the 
level below. That information layers on top of itself as it moves through the 
network until, eventually, a picture emerges to the system, and it makes a 
prediction (the black and rightmost node in Figure 1).48 
DLNNs learn to predict the output variable by training on datasets for 
which the output variable is known.49 A DLNN does not automatically know 
what relationships to discern between things at the level below; it learns these 
relationships during training.50 DLNNs represent these relationships as a 
 
 47 All images by author. 
 48 For a tutorial and a neat visual explainer on how this works, see Chris Olah et al.,  
Feature Visualization, DISTILL (Nov. 7, 2017), https://distill.pub/2017/feature-visualization 
[https://perma.cc/DAC7-STNB]. 
 49 This is called supervised learning. Many but not all DLNNs work this way. See LeCun et al., supra 
note 43, at 436. 
 50 In brief, the mechanism is as follows. Recall that information is extracted from the data by the 
DLNN through the nodes and the weights connecting the nodes. The nodes are always a pure function of 
their inputs: at the input layer, the nodes simply take the feature vector values; subsequent layers of nodes 
are determined as a function of the weights and the values of the previous layer. LeCun et al., supra note 
43, at 437 fig.1.c. The weights allow the DLNN to manage the transfer and transformation of information 
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complex, high-dimensional mathematical function that is extracted from 
patterns in the data and encoded throughout the DLNN. DLNNs use all the 
features in the data set except the desired output feature to predict that output 
feature. So if a DLNN was presented with colored shapes of different sizes, 
it might learn to use the color and shape to predict a given object’s size. 
Because all the information in the system between the input and output 
layers is purely mathematical, these systems largely defy inspection and 
explanation. In turn, this leads to the fundamental problem of neural 
networks: it may be difficult or even impossible to determine what the 
system is learning, so long as it is performing well on the training dataset.51 
Until a DLNN is deployed into the world, the only measure of accuracy the 
system engineers have is how well the system performs on the data to which 
they already have access. If the data are not representative of the underlying 
population, or contain patterns that correlate to outcomes but are not the 
“true” underlying function, then the system might learn to make predictions 
that are accurate on the training data but are not the kinds of predictions the 
engineers want the system to make. As long as the system performs well on 
the training data, engineers will not know the difference until they deploy 
the system. 
To illustrate this, consider the following (highly simplified) scenario. 
Imagine a company wants to train a DLNN to determine whether to give job 
candidates an interview. Their training data encodes whether the candidates 
have an advanced degree, relevant work experience, a strong reference, and 
 
through the system. DLNNs learn by adjusting these weights, based on the DLNN’s performance on the 
training data. 
 To begin training a DLNN, all weights between layers of nodes are set randomly, such that the input 
features are at first randomly mathematically manipulated to generate some prediction. Because in the 
training dataset the output variable to be predicted is known, the system can determine the extent to which 
its prediction, initialized randomly, is correct or not. To the extent the prediction is accurate, a signal is 
sent to strengthen the connections responsible for that prediction; to the extent it is inaccurate, a corrective 
signal is sent to update the weights accordingly. The DLNN repeatedly runs through the training dataset, 
examining the predictions made and strengthening or weakening the weights as needed. 
 DLNNs determine which weights to adjust and by how much using a technique called gradient 
descent, which is an application of the chain rule from high school calculus for decomposing derivatives. 
For more information on the chain rule, see LeCun et al., supra note 43, at 437. For a comprehensible 
resource on how neural network systems are initialized and trained, see Jason Brownlee, Why Initialize a 
Neural Network with Random Weights?, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://machinelearningmastery.com/why-initialize-a-neural-network-with-random-weights 
[https://perma.cc/KS3A-LJYD]. 
 51 See Pedro Domingos, A Few Useful Things to Know About Machine Learning, 55 COMM’S ACM 
78, 81 (2012). A system learns a set of weights that can extract from the input data a useful signal 
predicting the output category. But there may be many such configurations of weights, and the system 
will only learn one of those. 
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of course whether they in fact received a job interview.52 Further imagine 
that, in this scenario, the “true function” that the DLNN ought to learn is that 
candidates with two or three of the input variables should get an interview, 
but candidates with only one, or none, should not. The company trains its 
system on the data in Table 1.53 
TABLE 1: DATA WITH WHICH ONE MIGHT TRAIN A DLNN TO PREDICT WHETHER 







Did they get a job 
interview? 
1 Yes Yes No Yes 
2 Yes No No No 
3 No Yes Yes Yes 
4 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 No No Yes No 
6 No No No No 
7 No Yes Yes Yes 
Note that that in this dataset, everyone with two or more qualifications 
indeed received a job interview, and all others did not. But in addition, every 
candidate who got a job interview (candidates 1, 3, 4, and 7) had work 
experience, but none of the candidates who did not get a job interview 
(candidates 2, 5, and 6) had work experience. Thus, according to these data, 
although having two or more qualifications perfectly predicts whether a 
candidate got a job interview, so does the work experience attribute alone. If 
a single feature is highly correlated with an outcome, it represents a simple 
signal for the system to discern as “relevant” to that outcome, and the path 
of least resistance may lead the system to rely upon it.54 
 
 52 The training data must have the output variable in addition to the input variables if the system is 
to learn. The system uses the training data to learn a function mapping inputs to outputs. When the DLNN 
later receives applications with only the input variables, the system will itself be able to predict the output 
variable. 
 53 With such a simple function to be learned, humans could easily do this manually; furthermore, a 
real DLNN requires orders of magnitude more training data. This example is overly simplistic for 
illustration’s sake. 
 54 See generally Domingos, supra note 51, at 81. The correlation versus causation distinction is a 
simplification: DLNNs can learn functions more complicated than correlations, including theoretically 
any function a computer can run. See Hava T. Siegelmann & Eduardo D. Sontag, On the Computational 
Power of Neural Nets, 50 J. COMPUTER & SYS. SCI. 132, 133 (1995). But the distinction is a useful 
framework with which to understand these systems: just as many variables in a dataset may be correlated 
but not all causally related, there may be many functions—only one of which is “true”—that account for 
the patterns in a training dataset. See Domingos, supra note 51, at 86. If there is a set of factors highly 
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As such, it is easy to imagine how unintentional bias may arise where 
the candidates who were granted interviews were largely—and completely 
by chance—men, and the candidates who were denied interviews 
generally—and again by chance—were women. Even if the system 
engineers training the DLNN do not believe that gender predicts whether 
candidates should get job interviews, they are stuck with the dataset they 
have. Such dataset artifacts can be misleading to a DLNN, and can lead to 
problematic discrimination down the line, depending on the function the 
DLNN learns.55 
Unfortunately, and key to the problem described in this Note, it is not 
enough simply to remove sex (and potential proxies, like interest-in-Marie-
Claire) from the collection of features being input into the system56 because 
all the other features that remain can likely be used together to predict sex.57 
In other words, sex, like the actual outcome the system is seeking to learn, 
may be latently encoded in patterns in the data.58 If so, the DLNN (with sex 
removed as an input) could be used to predict sex as easily as the target 
prediction (Figure 2). 
 
 
correlated with the outcome in the training set, DLNNs may rely upon those factors instead of the true 
“causes” of the outcome. See Brian Hu Zhang et al., Mitigating Unwanted Biases with Adversarial 
Learning, 2018 PROC. AAAI/ACM CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ETHICS & SOC’Y 335, 335, 
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3278721.3278779 [https://perma.cc/5UFP-NGJL]. Ultimately, 
DLNNs generate predictions, not explanations. Id.; see also Allan G. King & Marko J. Mrkonich, “Big 
Data” and the Risk of Employment Discrimination, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 555, 560–63 (2016). 
 55 Bias can manifest through ML systems in a variety of ways, a discussion which falls outside the 
scope of this Note. See Jon Kleinberg et al., Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 27–31 (Apr. 22, 2019), https://academic.oup.com/jla/article-pdf/doi/10.1093/jla/ 
laz001/29186834/laz001.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8L2-8GD6]. 
 56 That is, were it even possible to determine what all the proxy features were. 
 57 This is known as “omitted variable bias.” See Kristian Lum & James E. Johndrow,  
A Statistical Framework for Fair Predictive Algorithms, ARXIV 1 (Oct. 25, 2016), https://arxiv.org/ 
pdf/1610.08077.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG77-9ES9]. 
 58 E.g., people who live in area A1 and have income I1 and like movies M1 are likely to be women; 
people who live in the same area A1 but have income I2 and like artists Q1 are likely to be women; people 
who live in area A2 and enjoy restaurants R1 and like brand B1 are likely to be women; etc. Sex, race, 
religion, and many other attributes may be latently encoded in the rest of a person’s data, just like the 
network’s target variable. 
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FIGURE 2: THE SAME NETWORK, WITH THE SAME ARCHITECTURE  
AND INPUTS, COULD BE USED TO PREDICT SEX 
 
Moreover, if the network could predict sex, it would mean the final 
hidden layer implicitly encodes the sex information of the person, extracted 
from patterns in the data. Accordingly, the network may still be making a 
prediction based on sex as a latent proxy variable, stymieing the efforts of 
the engineers who removed sex from the network’s inputs (Figure 3). Put 
differently, it is possible the model is not only predicting sex but is relying 
upon that prediction in reaching the final output, even when “sex” is removed 
from the set of inputs. 
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FIGURE 3: WHAT THE NETWORK MIGHT BE LEARNING TO DO 
 
But a DLNN is just comprised of numbers pointing at other numbers, 
and the way it searches for a meaningful signal is not a conscious effort to 
discover specific intermediary features, like “sex.”59 There will therefore 
never be a unit easily labeled “sex” that a diligent engineer might identify as 
encoding sex and which could be blamed for the outcome. Instead, the 
attribute “sex” will be distributed within the network, such that one or more 
states the final hidden layer might encode correspond to “female” while 
another set of states corresponds to “male.” Therefore, a better representation 
of a network predicting on the basis of sex, even without sex as an input, is 
that in Figure 4. 
 
 59 The input layer is also just numbers, but for the input layer we have a direct mapping from numbers 
to value. So while the DLNN might see ones and zeroes at the input layer, the engineers know, based on 
which unit the ones and zeroes appear at, how to convert those ones and zeroes into information that is 
meaningful to a human. 
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FIGURE 4: WHAT THE DLNN MIGHT ACTUALLY BE LEARNING, LEADING TO THE  
RESULT IN FIGURE 3 
 
Thus, a protected characteristic may still be used as a predictive 
factor, but not one easily recognized or excised. 
None of this is hypothetical. Amazon recently announced it was 
discontinuing using a system it had trained to vet resumes because it was 
displaying this problem.60 Because the pool of resumes sent to Amazon was 
(for historical and structural reasons)61 heavily skewed towards men, the 
system was downgrading women’s resumes. Blinding the system to terms 
that explicitly flagged the applicant’s gender did not solve the problem.62 
In the job offer example from Table 1, a single candidate who was 
qualified without work experience, or who only had work experience and 
 
 60 Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against Women, 
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2018, 10:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-
insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G 
[https://perma.cc/GM2Z-DCLB]. 
 61 That ML training datasets reflect the inequities of the world within which they are created is a 
serious problem outside the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA 
(May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing [https://perma.cc/AT37-A3EC] (describing bias against Blacks in the computed risk 
assessment scores used by courts to predict future criminal behavior). 
 62 Id. 
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was unqualified, would have prevented the system from learning the wrong 
function. But for most complex real-world applications, no dataset will 
encode only the “right” function that explains it; indeed, it is hard even to 
recognize the “right” equation, let alone ensure the system learns that 
equation.63 As a result, an ML system performing well on its training data 
will not necessarily perform well on new data.64 
To further illustrate and understand the problem, imagine that someone 
is trying to learn the simple, single-input mathematical function65 that 
generated the data in Figure 5.66 
 
 63 This problem follows from a family of theorems known as the no free lunch theorems, which 
indicate that across all problems, no one algorithm will consistently outperform all others. See David H. 
Wolpert & William G. Macready, No Free Lunch Theorems for Optimization, 1 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 67, 70–71 (1997); David H. Wolpert & William G. Macready, No Free 
Lunch Theorems for Search 1, 2 (Santa Fe Inst. Working Paper No. 1995-02-010, 1995). The problem is 
akin to the philosophical problem of induction, where one cannot be certain of one’s beliefs drawn only 
from observation. See DAVID HUME, 1 A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 82–84 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 
Clarendon Press 1896) (1739); see also Robert A. Peterson & Dwight R. Merunka, Convenience Samples 
of College Students and Research Reproducibility, 67 J. BUS. RES. 1035, 1035 (2014) (showing that some 
psychology studies may reflect not the cognition of humanity writ large, but that of the American 
undergraduate psychology majors upon whom the studies were conducted). 
 64 Domingos, supra note 51, at 81. Computer science students are taught this principle via a parable 
about a defense contractor that wanted to train a neural network to detect tanks. The contractor went out 
one day and took pictures of tanks in a variety of environments, then took the same pictures the next day 
without the tanks. The contractor trained a DLNN, which performed perfectly on the contractor’s images 
but could not detect a single tank in new images. One of the days had been sunny and the other overcast: 
the contractor had trained a sunshine detector. The story is apparently apocryphal. See Gwern Branwen, 
The Neural Net Tank Urban Legend, GWERN (Sept. 20, 2011, updated Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.gwern.net/Tanks [https://perma.cc/NZL2-XQAH]. Nonetheless, given its ubiquity in 
artificial intelligence education and how cleanly it illustrates the principle, it is included here. 
 65 E.g., f(x) = y. 
 66 Thanks to Professor Bryan Pardo for this illustrative exercise. 
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FIGURE 5: SOME DATA ABOUT WHICH ONE MIGHT WANT TO LEARN 
 
Figure 6 shows three functions that a ML system could learn that perfectly 
fit the data and might be equally good at predicting within this range. 
FIGURE 6: THREE FUNCTIONS THAT FIT THE DATA 
 
As long as the system operates on input data within this range, the 
engineers will have no way to know which of these three functions the 
system has learned. But once the system tries to predict the value of a point 
far off to either side of the training data, that prediction will look very 
different depending on which function the system has learned.67 
In sum, just because a system is good at predicting the data on which it 
was trained (or similar data), it may not fare well on data that does not 
resemble its training data. This happens because there are many functions 
that fit the training data and the system will only learn one; it is hard to detect 
it because before deploying the system, engineers can only verify its 
 
 67 See generally Domingos, supra note 51. 
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accuracy on the data they already have. Without a sufficiently diverse 
training dataset representing the full range of inputs an algorithm will operate 
over after deployment, this problem is a major concern.68 The best way to 
mitigate the problem is to have a better, richer dataset.69 
From a legal perspective, it is not clear whether there is any consistent 
way to properly apportion responsibility for an algorithm’s decisions.70 If the 
data encode latent biases that the dataset assemblers should have detected (or 
if those biases were intentionally incorporated), then the dataset engineers 
could be held responsible for the flaws in their dataset. But given historical 
and social inequities, it may be impossible to build a dataset free of bias, so 
we might want to hold the system’s engineers responsible to incentivize them 
to do everything they can to mitigate those biases. 
2. Understanding and Dealing with Hidden Biases 
This Section returns to the problem with both lookalike audiences and 
DLNNs in general: protected characteristics are embedded in other data, so 
even if a system does not see those characteristics, it may still discriminate 
on the basis of them.71 Because DLNNs are largely inscrutable except insofar 
as they appear to perform well, biases can stay hidden until the system 
operates on data dissimilar to its training data.72 Fortunately, there are options 
other than simply not using DLNNs that can control for these problems. By 
forcing systems to be bad at predicting protected variables73 and using tools 
that can give insight into a DLNN’s decisions, engineers can better manage 
the dangers DLNNs pose.74 
 
 68 There exists an associated problem known as poisoning attacks. See, e.g., Matthew Jagielski et al., 
Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures for Regression Learning, 
39 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 19 (2018). These involve malicious actors generating and 
promulgating free training datasets with a hidden factor that is hard to detect but can be exploited in 
systems that train on that data. Id. For example, the actor might create a dataset of videos of people either 
lying or not lying to create a lie detector; given how hungry machine learning engineers are for data, such 
a dataset might be extremely valuable and useful. But if the dataset creators include a few videos where 
a person with a distinctive style of mustache is lying but is labeled as telling the truth, the system might 
learn that that mustache is an indicator that the person is truthful. It would be hard to detect this feature 
in the dataset or to identify it in the system after it had been trained, but the actor who created the dataset 
could pass lie detector tests trained on the data by having that particular mustache. 
 69 Domingos, supra note 51, at 84. 
 70 See Kleinberg et al., supra note 55, at 6. 
 71 See supra Section I.C.1. 
 72 Supra Section I.C.1. 
 73 Zhang et al., supra note 54, at 335. 
 74 See Marco Ribeiro et al., “Why Should I Trust You?” Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier, 
2016 PROC. 22ND ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING (KDD ’16) 
1135, 1138–39; Chris Olah et al., The Building Blocks of Interpretability, DISTILL (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://distill.pub/2018/building-blocks [https://perma.cc/64UM-NXHV]. The most effective way to 
114:415 (2019) Algorithmic Advertising Discrimination 
437 
A technique called bias mitigation seeks to ensure that whatever 
function the system is learning, it is not learning simply to predict a forbidden 
characteristic.75 To train a bias mitigation system, the system learns not only 
to predict the desired outcome but also to predict the forbidden characteristic 
(e.g., sex).76 To the extent the system is bad at predicting the desired output, 
it is sent a signal to help it improve as usual.77 But to the extent that the 
system is good at predicting the forbidden characteristic, it is sent a signal to 
make its performance worse.78 The goal is to have the system accurately 
predict the target variable but be unable to predict the forbidden 
characteristic, meaning its prediction of the target variable is entirely 
independent of the protected characteristic.79 This solution mitigates rather 
than solves the problem of engineers being unable to discern what a DLNN 
has learned because it still does not explain which function the system is 
actually learning, but simply forecloses certain functions. Nonetheless, 
insofar as it prevents a DLNN from learning to rely on a protected 
characteristic, bias mitigation represents an important improvement over just 
letting the system learn whatever seems useful. 
There are three challenges to widespread adoption of the bias mitigation 
approach. First, training these systems is more computationally expensive 
and may make systems less accurate overall.80 System designers may not be 
inclined to use bias mitigation unless they are compelled to do so by ethics 
or the law. A bias mitigation system must not only learn a useful function 
but also ensure it is not learning a forbidden one, and this means more 
training time. All protected characteristics that are not to be predicted must 
be known in advance and precluded all at once, and each additional one 
means additional computation costs. Because it often takes a long time to 
train these systems, and because most companies rent the necessary 
 
mitigate these problems is through careful engineering that encodes sensible assumptions about the 
mathematical properties of the domain to be modeled. See Domingos, supra note 51, at 84–85. Even with 
diligent engineering, however, these problems exist; this Note assumes conscientious engineers are doing 
their best when building their systems and therefore will not delve into the mathematical considerations 
they must take into consideration. 
 75 Zhang et al., supra note 54, at 335. 
 76 Id. at 336–37. 
 77 Id. See supra note 50 for an explanation of DLNNs’ learning mechanisms and how accuracy is 
converted into signals to improve the DLNN’s performance. 
 78 Zhang et al., supra note 54, at 337. 
 79 Id. at 337–38. 
 80 Id. at 340. 
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computation power from server farms, extra computation translates directly 
to extra costs.81 
Second, these approaches are in their early days, and problems with 
them may yet be revealed. For example, these systems could theoretically 
learn to predict using protected characteristics and simultaneously learn to 
hide that they are doing so. Of course, this is not necessarily the case: these 
techniques are promising and may point to an eventual solution to the 
problem overall. But DLNNs are still black boxes, learning functions that 
cannot be directly examined, and it is too early to declare that bias mitigation 
is the ultimate solution to algorithmic bias. 
But the greatest obstacle is that, to ensure a DLNN is not learning a 
forbidden characteristic, that characteristic must be present in the training 
data.82 Engineers cannot learn to avoid predicting on the basis of sex from 
training data unless the characteristic of sex is in the training data.83 
Collecting this information may often prove awkward and problematic, and 
people may resist sharing such information with corporations, even if they 
are told why the corporation wants it. This may not be a great concern with 
Facebook in particular since Facebook users are accustomed to sharing 
private information. But mortgage applicants, for example, might balk if a 
bank started asking for race, sex, religion, and sexual orientation information 
on mortgage applications, and they might not be assuaged when told the bank 
was collecting that information to make sure it was not discriminating 
against them.84 
The other avenue for hope is not about mitigating bias but detecting it. 
Researchers have been working on techniques to explain ML systems’ 
 
 81 See, e.g., Peter Turney, Types of Cost in Inductive Concept Learning, 2000 PROC. COST-SENSITIVE 
LEARNING WORKSHOP 17TH ICML-2000 CONF. 1, 3–5. Though many tasks still require extensive 
training time, these costs are coming down and may soon not be a major obstacle. See Rob Matheson, 
Kicking Neural Network Design Automation into High Gear, MIT NEWS (Mar. 21, 2019), 
http://news.mit.edu/2019/convolutional-neural-network-automation-0321  
[https://perma.cc/B6LU-SUPZ]. 
 82 See Kroll et al., supra note 29, at 686. 
 83 Zhang, supra note 54, at 335; see also Kleinberg et al., supra note 55, at 34. 
 84 For a discussion of why people feel uncomfortable being asked such questions and how to ask 
them respectfully, see Sarai Rosenberg, Respectful Collection of Demographic Data, MEDIUM  
(Mar. 14, 2017), https://medium.com/@anna.sarai.rosenberg/respectful-collection-of-demographic-data-
56de9fcb80e2 [https://perma.cc/5U3A-P43H]. Not only might people be uncomfortable with such 
questions, but it could lead them to believe that discrimination is in fact occurring. See, e.g., Illegal 
Interview Questions, BETTERTEAM (July 30, 2019), https://www.betterteam.com/illegal-interview-
questions [https://perma.cc/J77Y-D8D3]. 
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decisions.85 Some explanation systems work by essentially running the ML 
system backwards, revealing what input features or combinations thereof 
were instrumental to the final decision.86 Others recreate the decision in a 
low-dimensional space that humans can understand, by eliding the 
characteristics that, if changed, would not have altered the outcome and 
showing how changing the values of the decisive features would have altered 
it.87 Generating such explanations can be computationally expensive 
(potentially requiring training a new system to explain each decision). 
Furthermore, if the explanation is confusing it might not be much more 
helpful to human understanding than no explanation at all. And as with bias 
mitigation, explanation systems have not yet been shown to be universally 
applicable or reliable. Nonetheless, in those situations where such 
explanations are helpful, they can help mitigate DLNNs’ black-box problem, 
which can in turn help recognize bias when it manifests.88 
This Note now turns to Title VII protections against employment 
discrimination. By analyzing the nature of the legal claims that can currently 
be brought and considering the mechanics of DLNNs discussed above, the 
following Part will clarify why relevant claims require adaptation to this 
domain and why litigation is ultimately inadequate to address the problems 
that arise at the intersection of these systems. 
II. EMPLOYMENT ADVERTISING DISCRIMINATION LAW 
Employment discrimination on the basis of certain protected 
characteristics is prohibited under Title VII.89 For the most part, Title VII is 
concerned with the practice of employers—the entities performing hiring, 
promotion, and firing decisions—and managing workplaces; it devotes 
significantly less language to employment agencies, the entities which 
“procure employees for an employer or . . . procure for employees 
 
 85 Ribeiro et al., supra note 74, at 1; Olah et al., supra note 74. These explanation systems work on 
a variety of ML approaches, not only DLNNs. 
 86 Olah et al., supra note 74. 
 87 Ribeiro et al., supra note 74, at 1. 
 88 This discussion only scratches the surface of the work currently performed in this area by a vibrant 
and active community of researchers. Outside of the scope of this Note, for example, is work concerning 
how even to define what an algorithm’s unbiased performance entails, i.e., what makes an algorithm’s 
performance “fair.” For an introduction, see generally Ben Hutchinson & Margaret Mitchell, 50 Years of 
Test (Un)Fairness: Lessons for Machine Learning, 2019 FAT *19, 2019 PROC. CONF. ON FAIRNESS 
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 49; Jon Kleinberg et al., Algorithmic Fairness, 108 AEA PAPERS 
& PROC. 22 (2018). 
 89 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
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opportunities to work . . . .”90 It specifies that such agencies cannot treat 
jobseekers differently on the basis of protected characteristics such as sex,91 
including advertising positions on the basis of sex where sex is not “a bona 
fide occupational qualification for employment” (BFOQ).92 
This Part briefly explores the basics of employment discrimination law 
as applied to employment agencies. It then describes actions plaintiffs can 
take to challenge the kinds of employment discrimination that may arise 
through the use of such systems. 
A. Discrimination Law for Employment Agencies 
The language of Title VII neither clearly defines what an employment 
agency is nor what they are forbidden to do. Although there have been many 
Title VII legal actions for employer discrimination, there has been little 
litigation over employment agency discrimination, and what little there has 
been has concerned overt discrimination. That is, it has either involved 
advertisements that explicitly seek applicants on a prohibited basis93 or 
facially neutral advertisements that are promoted only to persons with a 
certain characteristic.94 There appears never to have been a case involving a 
facially neutral advertisement unintentionally targeted in an unlawfully 
discriminatory fashion.95 
An employment agency is only liable under Title VII if it fulfills an 
employer’s discriminatory job placement order knowing that a 
discriminatory requirement is not a BFOQ, but the agency is not required to 
verify an employer’s claim that a sex specification is a BFOQ.96 In other 
words, the employment agency need only insist that the employer claim that 
 
 90 Id. § 2000e(c). 
 91 Id. § 2000e-2(b). 
 92 Id. § 2000e-3(b). 
 93 Most employment agency discrimination litigation has been of this kind. See, e.g., Illinois v. Xing 
Ying Emp’t Agency, No. 15 C 10235, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45179, at *6–8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2018) 
(holding that an employment agency cannot specify in an advertisement that it is specifically seeking 
Mexicans for restaurant jobs). 
 94 See, e.g., Morrow v. Miss. Publishers Corp., No. 72J-17(R), 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10972, at *8 
(S.D. Miss. Nov. 27, 1972) (reasoning that a newspaper may be an employment agency under Title VII 
if, on its own initiative, it classifies facially neutral ads as being for men or women and prints them in 
gendered sections of the classified page). 
 95 Searches on LexisNexis and WestLaw did not reveal any such cases in federal courts. 
 96 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.6(b) (2019). See generally Jerald 
J. Director, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) Making Sex Discrimination in Employment Unlawful, 12 A.L.R. Fed. 
15, 119–21 (1972). 
114:415 (2019) Algorithmic Advertising Discrimination 
441 
sex is a BFOQ of employment, and the agency is off the hook.97 An 
employment agency also does not have to ensure that the employer’s hiring 
practices are not discriminatory, only that its own referral practices are not 
discriminatory.98 
As an initial matter, to hold Facebook and other online advertising 
platforms responsible under Title VII for how they place job ads, they must 
be found to be employment agencies when they target third-party job ads to 
their users.99 Analyzing whether online advertising platforms are indeed 
employment agencies under Title VII is beyond the scope of this Note. But 
because they must be found to be employment agencies as a threshold matter 
if they are to be legally forbidden from placing ads in a discriminatory 
fashion, and because it is not unreasonable to conclude they are,100 this Note 
 
 97 In Facebook’s settlement it appears to promise to do exactly this, shifting part of the burden of 
certifying that ads are not being targeted in a discriminatory fashion to advertisers. Facebook says it will 
now “require advertisers to certify that they are complying with . . . all applicable anti-discrimination 
laws.” Settlement, supra note 16, at 2. 
 98 EEOC Decision No. 77–32, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA), 1977 WL 5352, at *1 (1977). 
 99 That is, such platforms must be found to be employment agencies under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) 
(2012). 
 100 In brief, the debate over whether Facebook is an employment agency may come down to two 
competing definitions of what qualifies an entity as an employment agency, both from court cases that 
predate the internet age. The main construction holds that employment agencies are “those engaged to a 
significant degree in that kind of activity as their profession or business.” Brush v. S.F. Newspaper 
Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577, 580 (N.D. Cal. 1970). But an organization may also be treated as an 
employment agency if it “significantly affects access of any individual to employment opportunities.” 
Scaglione v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 209 F. Supp. 2d 311, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Spirt v. 
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds sub nom. 
Long Island Univ. v. Spirt, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983)). The EEOC has indicated that an organization placing 
job ads, like a newspaper, counts as an employment agency under Title VII if it “exercise[s] control” over 
those advertisements or “actively classif[ies] advertisements” as being appropriate for different 
audiences. EEOC Compl. Man. § 631.2(b)(1) (2009). 
 While there is little publicly available information about what share of Facebook’s advertisement 
market constitutes job ads, making it difficult to know if job ads are a significant part of Facebook’s 
business, Facebook is a free service that derives its income from advertisements. See Gilbert, supra note 
12. And yet, even if the overall share of Facebook’s revenue from job ads is small, when such an ad is 
placed on Facebook, Facebook exercises nearly total control over which users will see that ad, and who 
will therefore become aware of that job opportunity. Id. Thus, the definitions of what qualifies an 
organization as an employment agency seem to be, for Facebook, in conflict. If one focuses on the 
proportion of Facebook’s ad sales from job ads, Facebook may not seem like an employment agency 
under the Brush definition. 315 F. Supp at 580. But given the increasing numbers of job ads placed on 
platforms like Facebook’s, Facebook appears to qualify as an employment agency under the Scaglione 
definition. 209 F.Supp.2d at 319. 
 The fact that Facebook controls ad placement requires resolving this tension in favor of holding 
Facebook to be an employment agency. Relatively little of its advertising revenue may come from 
employment ads, but it nonetheless plays a sufficiently significant gatekeeping role as a deliverer of 
employment advertisements that it ought to be considered an employment agency under Title VII. Indeed, 
the purposes of Title VII’s prohibitions against employment agency discrimination would be undermined 
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will assume that Facebook and other online advertising platforms are indeed 
employment agencies under Title VII when they target job ads to users. 
Assuming Facebook and similar online advertising platforms are 
employment agencies, the following Section turns to several challenges that 
can be brought for employment discrimination. These challenges vary based 
on the nature of the discrimination alleged. 
B. Relevant Title VII Employment Discrimination Actions 
Under current legal doctrine, employment discrimination is addressed 
retroactively through litigation; employers that might otherwise discriminate 
do not do so out of fear of litigation in response.101 This Section will describe 
several kinds of claims that can currently be brought under Title VII in 
response to a discriminatory employment practice. 
Employment discrimination claims fall under two general categories: 
disparate treatment and disparate impact.102 Disparate treatment involves 
intentionally treating people differently on the basis of a protected 
characteristic,103 while disparate impact involves a facially neutral practice 
that nonetheless results in a disparity along such a characteristic.104 The 
following Sections will briefly consider each in turn, along with certain 
subspecifications of each of these doctrines before turning to how these 
doctrines may be applied to discriminatory online advertisement targeting. 
1. Disparate Treatment 
Employment discrimination actions brought against employment 
agencies have thus far all been on the basis of disparate treatment. Disparate 
treatment occurs when groups are treated differently on the basis of a 
protected characteristic; it involves discriminatory intent.105 The Supreme 
 
by finding that an organization that targets and delivers a significant portion of all employment ads is not 
an employment agency if it is sufficiently large that these job ads make up only a small part of its total 
business. Thus, as a matter of policy, Facebook should be considered an employment agency under Title 
VII. Given how prevalent advertising job opportunities online has become, to not find that Facebook is 
an employment agency is to allow the exception to swallow the rule. 
 This argument deserves substantially more extensive development and is outside the scope of this 
Note. It is included here only to show that, although it is not a foregone conclusion that Facebook and 
similar advertisers would be found to be employment agencies, neither is it unreasonable to argue that 
they can and should be. 
 101 See infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 102 JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., 4 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS ¶ 21.23 (Matthew  
Bender & Co. eds., updated 2019), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/37c776b6-725a-4ae0-a96a-
073766884322/?context=1000516 [https://perma.cc/N9Q2-HSHK]. 
 103 Id. ¶ 21.22. 
 104 Id. ¶ 21.23. 
 105 Id. ¶ 21.22. 
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Court has held that disparate treatment involves “the refusal to recruit, hire, 
transfer, or promote [protected] group members on an equal basis with 
[others],” specifically because they are members of different groups.106 
Up until Facebook’s settlement of various discrimination lawsuits, it 
required advertisers to specify a gender to which their ads would be 
displayed (“Male,” “Female,” or “All”).107 Advertisers were not required to 
justify this targeting.108 Facebook was wise to have settled these lawsuits: 
had the cases proceeded and Facebook been found to be an employment 
agency, this gender-based targeting would very likely have run afoul of the 
law, especially since Facebook did not require the advertisers to aver that 
gender-based targeting represented a BFOQ of employment.109 
Disparate treatment actions can also be founded on a claim that 
employment decisions were made in reliance upon stereotypes about 
protected characteristics.110 For instance, employers can be held liable for 
denying a female employee a promotion because she is purportedly 
insufficiently feminine.111 Reliance on such stereotypes in employment 
decisions can form the basis of a claim of disparate treatment and lead to 
employer liability.112 One strength of antistereotyping theory is that plaintiffs 
can state a claim of disparate impact without providing evidence that those 
who did not share the plaintiff’s protected characteristic were treated 
differently.113 That is, although a claim for disparate treatment usually 
involves showing a disparity in treatment between people with the protected 
characteristic and those without,114 those same claims brought under an 
antistereotyping theory only require a showing that stereotypes about the 
protected group were relied upon in making employment decisions. 
2. Disparate Impact 
The core of disparate impact doctrine in employment discrimination is 
that “[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination [i.e., disparate 
treatment] but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in 
 
 106 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977). 
 107 Complaint, supra note 15, at 1. 
 108 Id. 
 109 As noted supra note 28 and accompanying text, because Facebook is no longer targeting ads in 
this way, the problems described in Section I.C of this Note are now the primary areas of concern 
involving potential discrimination by online advertising platforms like Facebook. See infra Part III. 
 110 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 111 Id. at 235; see Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 548–
49 (2018) (discussing antistereotyping cases). 
 112 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. 
 113 Bornstein, supra note 111, at 549. 
 114 COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 102, ¶ 21.22. 
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operation.”115 So if an employment practice appears facially neutral but 
affects people differently along a protected characteristic, the people 
negatively affected will have a cause of action under Title VII. The Supreme 
Court has held that showing discrimination through disparate impact requires 
not just showing a difference among groups, but also a showing that this 
difference is not reflected in the pool of qualified applicants.116 Furthermore, 
a facially neutral practice that assesses factors related to work qualifications 
but which may result in a disparate impact, like a written exam, cannot on its 
own be the basis of a claim of disparate impact.117 
Courts have used two tests to recognize a disparity in outcomes between 
groups: statistical significance (performing a statistical analysis to determine 
whether the disparity is unlikely to be due to chance) and the “four-fifths” 
rule (checking to see whether one group passes through the process at less 
than four-fifths the rate of another group).118 The statistical significance test 
has the advantage of allowing plaintiffs to use a variety of statistical 
measures to examine whether disparities are due to chance,119 some of which 
may not require precise knowledge of underlying population statistics. The 
disadvantage is that statistical methods are extremely sensitive to sample size 
and thus may not be able to detect discrimination on small scales.120 On the 
other hand, the four-fifths rule has the advantage of being simple to apply 
and understand if one has the relevant population statistics,121 but it sets a 
fairly high bar for plaintiffs insofar as the disparity must be fairly (even 
arbitrarily) high to be actionable,122 which is especially challenging when 
taking on a fairly large employer or employment agency. 
Stating a disparate impact claim requires the plaintiff to point to the 
specific practice leading to the disparity and to show that a better alternative 
 
 115 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 116 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650–51 (1989); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. 
v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (“[A] proper comparison [is] between the racial composition 
of [employees] and the racial composition of the qualified . . . population in the relevant labor market.”). 
 117 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579–80, 587 (2009). A facially neutral practice that results in 
a disparate impact may sustain a claim of disparate impact if it can be shown that a less discriminatory 
and equally effective alternative exists that the employer refused to use. Id. 
 118 Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L. J. 
773, 774 (2009) (citation omitted). The EEOC uses the four-fifths rule as an acceptable means of 
demonstrating disparate impact. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1607.4(D) (2019). 
 119 Peresie, supra note 118, at 785. 
 120 Id. at 787. 
 121 Id. at 783. 
 122 Id. at 782. 
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practice exists.123 Both of these requirements have been repeatedly 
reaffirmed.124 Finally, even after a prima facie case of disparate impact has 
been made against a business, that business can raise a defense of business 
necessity.125 Whether a business can claim business necessity for a 
discriminatory practice depends upon “whether a challenged practice serves, 
in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer” and 
upon “the availability of alternative practices to achieve the same [goal], with 
less [discriminatory] impact.”126 The practice need not be absolutely 
necessary for the business;127 instead, it need only advance the business’s 
goals in a way that no nondiscriminatory practice can be shown to do.128 
One of the ACLU’s claims against Facebook in one of the recently-
settled lawsuits was that Facebook discriminated by using a practice “legally 
indistinguishable from word-of-mouth hiring,”129 which is actionable under 
a theory of disparate impact.130 Word-of-mouth hiring occurs when 
employers advertise jobs to the people they know, and those people in turn 
tell other people they know about the jobs.131 For example, in one case, a 
power company filled employment vacancies by having workers tell their 
friends about the vacancies; because the workers were mostly white, the 
people who heard about the job opportunities were overwhelmingly white, 
causing only a small percentage of the company’s labor force to be black.132 
Word-of-mouth hiring has been held to be discriminatory because it 
leads to a “circumscribed web of information” about job opportunities,133 and 
 
 123 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). The Watson Court goes on to 
acknowledge that although identifying the specific practice at fault is “relatively easy to do in challenges 
to standardized tests, it may sometimes be more difficult when subjective selection criteria are at issue.” 
Id. 
 124 These requirements were most recently reaffirmed, as of September 2019, in Texas Department 
of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) 
(reaffirming the requirement that plaintiffs point to the specific practice leading to the disparity); id. at 
2518 (citing Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009)) (reaffirming the requirement that plaintiffs 
provide a better alternative practice). 
 125 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578. 
 126 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1989). 
 127 Id. at 659. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Complaint, supra note 15, at 12. The ACLU’s claim was that using a lookalike audience to target 
job ads was equivalent to spreading information about job opportunities by word-of-mouth. Id. 
 130 United States v. Ga. Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925 (5th Cir. 1973) (requiring employer to take 
affirmative steps to offset the disparate impact of the company’s word-of-mouth hiring practices). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 925–26. 
 133 Id. at 926. 
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establishes “a prima facie case of disparate impact.”134 Unlike other disparate 
impact claims, word-of-mouth employment discrimination claims are 
inherently about advertisement, that is, the promulgation of information 
regarding job opportunities. Nonetheless, there has never been a case where 
word-of-mouth hiring was the basis of a successful claim against an 
advertising agency.135 
III. APPLYING AND ADAPTING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION  
TO MACHINE LEARNING 
This Note has provided an overview of the basic processes through 
which employment ads can be targeted to users on social media platforms 
like Facebook,136 the mechanics of deep learning neural networks,137 and the 
possible employment discrimination actions under current legal doctrine.138 
This Part now begins to integrate these different strands by examining how 
algorithmic advertising discrimination can be challenged under Title VII, 
what the obstacles to bringing such challenges are, and how legal scholars 
have proposed adapting Title VII to the domain of algorithmic employment 
discrimination. 
Despite the challenges posed by DLNN systems as previously 
described,139 existing legal doctrine may well be adaptable to these 
challenges and allow individual plaintiffs redress against employers and 
employment agencies that discriminate against them. Indeed, Professor 
Joshua Kroll and his colleagues have suggested that existing 
antidiscrimination doctrine may not require adaptation: they suggest that any 
changes to the status quo focus on ensuring algorithms generate sufficient 
explanations for their decisions rather than adapting employment 
discrimination to the challenges these algorithms present.140 They argue that 
current employment discrimination law may already compel system 
 
 134 United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 126 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
635 F.2d 1007, 1016 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
135 A search of WestLaw and Lexis Nexis did not reveal any cases where an advertising agency was 
successfully sued under a theory of word-of-mouth discrimination. 
 136 Supra Sections I.A–I.B. 
 137 Supra Section I.C. 
 138 Supra Part II. 
 139 The main problem with which this Note is concerned is that it can be difficult to prevent a DLNN 
from learning a discriminatory function, or indeed to discern what function it has learned. See supra 
Section I.C.1. 
 140 Kroll et al., supra note 29, at 695–705 (2017). 
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engineers to design their systems for nondiscrimination,141 which will occur 
by having engineers design their systems to provide post hoc explanations.142 
Professor Kroll and his colleagues’ proposed solution masks the scale 
of its ambition and the difficulty of its realization by shifting it outside the 
context of discrimination law. Having systems like DLNNs generate reliable 
post hoc explanations is an open problem in artificial intelligence: requiring 
engineers to have their systems be able to generate explanations may result 
in such systems being made functionally illegal for many purposes, which 
no scholars have endorsed.143 Moreover, because systems for explaining 
DLNN decision-making are not yet universally reliable, clear, and 
consistent,144 encouraging or even requiring engineers to have their systems 
provide the best explanation they can generate may not even be helpful in a 
given case if the explanation does not clearly resolve the issues. 
Nonetheless, Professor Kroll and colleagues are correct that if the facts 
underlying employment discrimination can be discovered, existing 
employment discrimination actions may well suffice to provide relief for 
individual plaintiffs. Whether such facts are discoverable, however, has not 
been addressed. This Note now turns to the actions available to such 
plaintiffs, specifically examining whether the facts required to state a claim 
 
 141 Id. at 694–95. It is not clear whether Professor Kroll and his colleagues believe that current 
employment discrimination law legally compels designing for nondiscrimination or if they see this 
question as irrelevant. Regardless, they focus on technologically driven, rather than legally driven, 
solutions, arguing that the main responsibilities that lawmakers and policymakers have are to clarify what 
the law is and to maintain vigilance over and literacy with regard to how such systems are used. Id. at 
699–704. 
 142 Id. at 698. Kroll and colleagues acknowledge that it is not entirely clear how Title VII might be 
applied to a discriminatory algorithm and that it is possible that claims against discriminatory algorithms 
might be rejected under current legal doctrine, id. at 693–95, but they ultimately conclude that the solution 
to this problem lies in changing the algorithms rather than legal doctrine, id. at 696–99. See also Solon 
Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV 671, 729–32 (2016) 
(arguing that the problem lies not with Title VII, but with the explanations generated by data mining in 
ML systems: where machine learning systems introduce new biases and forms of discrimination into the 
workplace, they argue that Title VII should be sufficient to address and rectify the problem, but where 
ML systems instead replicate and propagate disparities that exist in broader society, Title VII is the wrong 
tool for the job, and the designers of the systems should not be held responsible); Kleinberg et al., supra 
note 55, at 51 (arguing that, if steps are taken to ensure ML systems are developed transparently, “[t]he 
use of algorithms offers far greater clarity and transparency about the ingredients and motivations of 
decisions, and hence far greater opportunity to ferret out discrimination”). 
 143 The explanation systems described supra Section I.C.2 hold promise but are not universally and 
consistently reliable across ML systems. If the law requires systems to provide explanations but the 
technology cannot reliably generate such explanations, the systems are in violation of the law until the 
explanation systems improve. In any event, having the ability to generate such explanations would not 
necessarily mean the problem was solved. 
 144 See supra Section I.C.2. 
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can be discovered under existing doctrine and discussing changes to 
employment discrimination law that scholars have proposed to make these 
facts more discoverable. 
A. Disparate Treatment 
Disparate treatment occurs when groups are treated differently on the 
basis of a protected characteristic and involves discriminatory intent.145 
Disparate treatment might have been a legally adequate cause of action as 
long as Facebook allowed targeting job ads explicitly on the basis of gender 
or of variables that are clearly proxies for gender.146 But in light of 
Facebook’s settlement prohibiting such explicit targeting,147 plaintiffs will 
likely not be able to make out a claim of disparate treatment against 
Facebook’s advertising placement practices. Indeed, once protected 
characteristics are removed from the data upon which machine learning 
systems train and operate, it will be nearly impossible to demonstrate that 
those systems are treating people differently on the basis of those 
characteristics—even if they are.148 If the data with which the algorithm are 
trained encode the biases of the people who collected the data, the algorithm 
will likely be biased. But there may be no single actor or institution at any 
point in the process who demonstrably displayed a biased intent, especially 
if the system was trained on a dataset compiled by a third party.149 
A plaintiff might be able to show that the training data were generated 
or manipulated in such a way that a court could infer that the actor’s intention 
was to train a discriminatory system.150 But it also is possible that no humans 
 
 145 See supra Section II.B.1. 
 146 Such claims may still prove workable against other ad platforms that allow such targeting. 
Nonetheless, Professor Kroll and his colleagues provide an insightful warning against bringing such 
claims. An allegation of disparate treatment based only on the fact that  
the design of the algorithm includes inputs that are a proxy for class membership . . . would  
be valid against virtually any system with a significant number of inputs. It seems more likely  
that courts would reject the formal-rule subset of disparate treatment for algorithmic decisions  
than that they would hold the majority of algorithmic decision-making to constitute  
disparate treatment. 
Kroll et al., supra note 29, at 695. 
 147 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 148 Such information may be latently encoded in the rest of the data. See supra Section I.C.1. 
 149 Given that many separate actors are often involved in designing what features a dataset should 
encode, assembling that dataset, designing a DLNN’s architecture, and actually training a DLNN system 
on that dataset, assigning blame for the DLNN’s actions is a challenging problem and is outside of the 
scope of this Note. 
 150  Barocas & Selbst, supra note 142, at 692–93; Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at 
Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 884–85 (2017); Kroll et al., supra note 29, at 681–82. 
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involved in collecting data or training a system will have behaved with 
discriminatory intent or outright treated groups differently on the basis of a 
protected characteristic, but that the algorithm that results from the interplay 
of their actions does. The doctrine of disparate treatment will either have to 
adapt to these facts or will not be the avenue through which algorithmic 
discrimination will be challenged. 
B. Antistereotyping Theory 
Professor Stephanie Bornstein has proposed that algorithmic 
discrimination can be challenged in court as being based in and reflective of 
stereotypes.151 She incisively notes that the fact that antistereotyping theory 
does not require comparing the plaintiff’s treatment against the treatment of 
others is an enormous benefit in the domain of algorithmic discrimination.152 
In the context of advertising discrimination in particular, where it may be 
extremely difficult to uncover information regarding the treatment of the 
underlying base group, this is a significant advantage for plaintiffs.153 And 
indeed, as discussed in Part I, machine learning algorithms may well be 
learning something akin to a stereotype, that is, a function that encodes that 
people of this category tend to result in that outcome.154 The problem with 
using an antistereotyping theory is that there is no way to show that this is, 
in fact, the function that the algorithm has learned.155 
Antistereotype claims brought under Title VII are claims of disparate 
treatment.156 As the Court in Price Waterhouse explained, “[t]he plaintiff 
must show that the employer actually relied on [the forbidden characteristic] 
in making its decision.”157 In a plaintiff’s best-case scenario, she would have 
to show that “the algorithm is trained on data that itself incorporates 
subjective biases” and is replicating them;158 at worst, she would have to 
 
 151 Bornstein, supra note 111, at 549–50. 
 152 Id. at 549.  
 153 It is difficult to uncover such information in this context because the ads are shown in real time 
on the private profiles of individual users. Unless all such ads were to be monitored, it may be impossible 
for a plaintiff to determine who saw which ads. Such information may well be obtainable through 
discovery, but the plaintiff must state a valid claim before getting to discovery, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678–79 (2009). It is unlikely that a company like Facebook would volunteer to potential plaintiffs 
the information necessary to state a claim against it. Thus the information required to get to discovery 
may only be accessible to plaintiffs through discovery. 
 154 See supra notes 52–62 and accompanying text. 
 155 An antistereotyping theory may be effective against decisions by more interpretable ML systems, 
like nearest neighbor. See generally Cover & Hart, supra note 43. 
 156 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 157 Id. (emphasis added). 
 158 Bornstein, supra note 111, at 562. 
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show that the algorithm had extracted harmful latent stereotypes from the 
dataset upon which it was trained. In the first case, relying upon an 
antistereotyping theory would therefore only move the goalposts from 
showing that the algorithmic decision-maker relied upon stereotypes to 
showing that the people who generated the training data relied upon them. In 
the second, the difficulties involved in showing what the system had learned 
would directly translate into a difficulty in showing it was making its 
predictions on a forbidden basis.159 
C. Disparate Impact 
If employment ads on online platforms are not being targeted explicitly 
on the basis of a protected characteristic, then they will be illegally 
discriminatory if they are shown to one group much more than another; that 
is, if their targeting results in a disparate impact among groups.160 But once 
Facebook removes protected characteristics from the bases for advertising, 
this discrimination will become apparent only by examining the entire 
population of people to whom the ad is shown. Who saw which ad is likely 
information that can be discerned through discovery, but plaintiffs still must 
successfully state a plausible claim for relief before they can proceed to 
discovery.161 Additionally, showing that the group of people who see an ad 
does not reflect the underlying pool of candidates may require accessing the 
data of Facebook users generally, which raises serious privacy issues.162 And 
showing that there is an available nondiscriminatory alternative,163 such as 
using bias mitigating approaches, would require inspecting the actual 
algorithms used by companies like Facebook—algorithms that form the 
basis of their revenue-raising business and are fiercely guarded trade 
secrets.164 
 
 159 Kroll and his colleagues’ warning holds true in this area about how plaintiffs’ overclaiming the 
potential for algorithmic discrimination could hurt efforts to bring such claims. See supra note 146 and 
accompanying text. A claim that a DLNN’s potential to be discriminating on the basis of stereotypes 
might lead courts to broadly reject such challenges as potentially attaching too much liability to too many 
actors. 
 160 See supra Section II.B.2. 
 161 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); see supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 162 But see Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to 
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 124–27 (2014) (suggesting a procedure for due 
process that includes a hearing with a trusted third party “act[ing] as a neutral data arbiter to routinely 
examine Big Data providers”). 
 163 See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text. 
 164 See, e.g., David S. Levine, Confidentiality Creep and Opportunistic Privacy, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 11, 28–29 (2017). Additionally, explaining the complex, technical nature of these 
algorithms will be an obstacle to litigators, although hardly an insurmountable one. 
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Even if disparate impact is shown, it may be nearly impossible for a 
plaintiff to narrow down the specific cause of that disparate impact.165 
Assigning blame to either advertisers expressing their preferences, biases 
and dataset artifacts amongst the algorithm’s training data, or the company 
that actually trained the algorithm, may be extremely difficult. Yet 
recovering against an employment agency requires finding the employment 
agency responsible for the discrimination.166 Thus, stating a claim against a 
company like Facebook for how its algorithm placed an ad is complicated: 
no one, including the people who built it, will know exactly what the 
algorithm is doing, except by reference to the observable actions it takes.167 
Professor Pauline Kim has argued that Title VII could be read to 
directly prohibit disparate outcomes stemming from the use of machine 
learning systems, without necessarily requiring plaintiffs to identify the 
specific practice used nor to show that a better practice is available.168 
However, she recognizes that even if plaintiffs are only required to show a 
disparity in outcomes and nothing more, discovering such a disparity can be 
enormously challenging because the data that encode those disparities are 
privately held by companies.169 Therefore, Professor Kim argues that 
discovery rules should be modified in the employment context to allow 
plaintiffs to better gather the information necessary to state a claim for 
disparate impact resulting from the use of ML systems.170 
Professor Kim’s solution seems sound and particularly workable with 
regard to the domain of hiring and promotion decisions. When companies 
hire or promote people, there is a circumscribed universe from which 
potential candidates are selected (i.e., applicants to a job or those eligible for 
promotion), so it is relatively straightforward to compare the group that was 
advanced against the entire selection pool. But it may not catch such 
discrimination in the domain of employment advertising. For advertising, 
the comparison group is substantially more nebulous, comprising all people 
 
 165 Kim, supra note 150, at 909 (“[T]he concept of disparate impact . . . applies to classification bias. 
The problem is that the ways the doctrine has been applied in the past are not well suited to address the 
data-driven nature of classification bias.”). 
 166 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 167 See supra Section I.C.1. As discussed supra Section I.C.2, there is a certain extent to which 
individual decisions might be explainable, but explaining the workings of the system as a whole is a 
significant technical, to say nothing of legal, challenge. 
 168 Kim, supra note 150, at 910–12. 
 169 Id. at 919. 
 170 Id. at 917–20; see also King & Mrkonich, supra note 54, at 567 (explaining how plaintiffs in such 
actions will have to obtain information crucial to their claim through discovery). 
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who possibly could have been shown an ad.171 Depending on the nature of 
the advertisement, this could conceivably include all users of a social-media 
system. 
Furthermore, companies such as Facebook may be able to reasonably 
make claims of business necessity, even if it is possible to show that their 
ad-placing systems are discriminatory.172 Facebook (and Google, and other 
such platforms) make the bulk of their revenue by targeting ads to users on 
the basis of those users’ profiles,173 and they must rely on ML algorithms to 
do so because targeting ads by hand is impracticable with billions of users 
and hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of advertisers. And there is no 
guarantee that humans would do a “better”—that is, a less biased—job. 
These companies can therefore make a compelling argument that biased or 
not, they have no choice but to use these systems.174 
Yet arguing that ML algorithms are necessary and unavoidable misses 
the point. The argument is not that ML algorithms should not be used but 
that the engineers must do everything they can to correct the biases within 
those algorithms. But such changes involve costs. There will generally be an 
argument that taking any steps to ensure those algorithms are as unbiased as 
possible involves high engineering and computational costs and no 
guarantees of success, even for companies with ample resources, like 
Facebook.175 Under current legal doctrine, this argument is likely to be found 
 
 171 The comparison group who did not see an advertisement will be ill-defined in any advertising 
discrimination claim, not just employment discrimination. 
 172 See supra Section II.B.2. 
 173 Gilbert, supra note 12. 
 174 Similarly, Professor Kim as well as Professors Barocas and Selbst have noted that systems that 
learn who to hire and promote based on past hiring and promotion data would pass a requirement that 
they be related to successful prediction as they are by definition learning a predictive model. See Kim, 
supra note 150, at 866; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 142, at 708–09. ML systems that predict past patterns 
are, in fact, predicting those patterns. Professor Kim points out that this is a compelling argument for not 
treating ML systems as unbiased simply because they are good at predicting past outcomes. Kim, supra 
note 150, at 866. 
 Professor Kim’s point has merit in that regard, but hiring and promotion systems are fundamentally 
different from ML ad-placement systems: ad-placement systems do not operate over a circumscribed set 
of possible hires. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Such systems have less of a claim to be 
related to job performance than a system that predicts hiring decisions: unlike hiring or promotion 
decisions, where the system clearly know who was not hired or promoted, advertising decisions derive 
directly from the pool of people being targeted, without a clear comparison group to learn the salient 
features that meaningfully differentiate them from the general population and which can predict actual 
job performance, see supra Section I.B. The system, therefore, will not learn to drop useless, 
nonpredictive characteristics. There is no way to know whether someone would have clicked on a job ad 
and would be qualified for that job if they were not even shown the ad. Thus, ad-placement systems have 
a weaker claim to be related to eventual job performance than hiring and promoting systems. 
 175 See supra Section I.C.2. 
114:415 (2019) Algorithmic Advertising Discrimination 
453 
persuasive by default,176 which could allow companies like Facebook to 
avoid taking any such steps. At a minimum this must change, so that such 
companies must take reasonable steps towards unbiasing their systems.177 
Automated systems that learn their own decision-making criteria 
present a fundamentally new kind of actor in the employment discrimination 
context.178 Up until now, the legal system has dealt with inert tools like 
questionnaires and tests—which, so long as they are facially neutral and a 
better option is not available, are permitted to lead to disparate impacts upon 
the populations those tools assess179—and humans, who are not allowed to 
make decisions on the basis of forbidden characteristics. Machine learning 
systems are capable of being facially neutral, like a test, while learning to 
make decisions using characteristics upon which humans would not be 
allowed to base decisions.180 These systems therefore may be too neutral to 
be caught by a theory of disparate treatment and not biased enough to be 
prohibited under a theory of disparate impact. 
D. Word-of-Mouth Hiring  
Because Facebook settled the ACLU’s lawsuit against it, it remains 
unclear whether the ACLU’s challenge against Facebook’s lookalike 
audience tool under principles of word-of-mouth hiring would have been 
successful. Word-of-mouth hiring certainly has parallels to what Facebook 
does. Word-of-mouth hiring is not allowed because of the assumption that 
the people passing along job openings know other people like them, and 
advertising only to people that “look like” the people an individual knows 
“circumscribe[s the] web of information” in violation of Title VII.181 
Similarly, advertising to friends of people already being shown ads is only 
one step removed from traditional word-of-mouth hiring. 
But the advertising techniques used by Facebook and similar online 
advertising platforms are not analogous to word-of-mouth hiring in key 
ways. Advertisers can target users quite different and disconnected from 
 
 176 See supra notes 125–128 and accompanying text. 
 177 Kroll and his colleagues agree that encouraging developers to do everything possible to design 
systems not to discriminate is desirable. Kroll, supra note 29, at 695. But they argue that system engineers 
simply should design their systems not to discriminate, even if Title VII does not outright require them 
to do so. Id. at 694–95. Although that would be an ideal scenario, it seems more likely that corporations 
would avoid voluntarily making the necessary, costly development of their algorithms. 
 178 See id. at 693. 
 179 Provided they assess things related to work qualifications. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 572, 579 
(2009). 
 180 See supra Section I.C.1. 
 181 United States v. Ga. Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925–26 (1973). 
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their base group, suggesting the “web of information” is not circumscribed 
to people highly similar to members of the original group.182 If the lookalike 
audience does not sufficiently resemble the advertiser-supplied audience, a 
court might find that the reasons to forbid word-of-mouth hiring are not 
implicated. And generating advertising audiences using lookalike 
technology is literally not word-of-mouth hiring: the people seeing the ads 
may have absolutely no social connection to the base group. Thus, if a court 
strictly construes principles of word-of-mouth hiring prohibitions, tools like 
Facebook’s lookalike audience tool will likely not be found to be a word-of-
mouth hiring practice. 
E. Reckless Discrimination 
Professor Bornstein has additionally proposed a new theory of liability 
for discrimination caused through recklessness, one that could address the 
shortcomings in disparate impact liability actions.183 Aiming to address the 
problem of employers failing to make any effort to correct for the problem 
of implicit bias, Professor Bornstein proposes that liability under Title VII 
should accrue to employers who ignore well-documented risks of bias and 
do not take well-established steps to reduce those risks.184 Under this theory, 
a conscious disregard for a well-established risk that results in that risk 
coming to fruition should be found to be sufficiently similar to intending the 
undesirable outcome that the employer is held liable under Title VII.185 This 
theory of liability would be based on disparate treatment (with reckless 
intent) rather than pure disparate impact.186 
The domain of implicit bias in humans is somewhat analogous to the 
problem of algorithmic bias in DLNN systems. Implicit bias in humans 
involves the unconscious activation of an attitude or stereotype about a 
person based on their group membership.187 Based on this activation, human 
decisions and judgments about a person can be affected by the knowledge 
that that person is a member of that particular group.188 Similarly, the concern 
 
 182 “Creating a larger audience increases your potential reach, but reduces the level of similarity 
between the Lookalike Audience and source audience.” About Lookalike Audiences, FACEBOOK: 
BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/business/help/164749007013531 [https://perma.cc/F9GU-9LLY]. 
 183 Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1055–56 (2017). 
 184 Id. at 1103. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 1105. 
 187 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, 
Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCH. REV. 4, 7–10, 14–18 (1995). 
 188 Id. 
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with DLNNs is that latent patterns in an individual’s data will lead the system 
to discern and rely upon that individual’s membership in a protected group.189 
People are by definition not aware when their decisions involve 
unconscious biases; when they attend to the source of the bias, the bias is 
reduced.190 So once they are aware of the potential for bias, employers and 
individuals can take effective steps to reduce its impact.191 Similarly, ML 
researchers are sufficiently aware of the problem of algorithmic bias that 
researchers are working on ways to mitigate the problem,192 and Facebook 
has now agreed to police at least the potential biasing use of information that 
acts as a proxy for protected characteristics.193 Professor Bornstein makes a 
compelling argument that, given the well-documented prevalence of implicit 
biases, employers should almost be required to take such preventative 
steps.194 
Adopting a doctrine of reckless discrimination under Title VII, 
particularly in the domain of algorithmic decision-making, could alleviate 
some of the burdens plaintiffs must bear when they seek to connect an 
employer’s use of an algorithm to some negative outcome. Because this 
theory is grounded in disparate treatment rather than disparate impact, it 
would reduce the availability of the business necessity defense.195 It would 
also place the responsibility squarely on the employer rather than the system 
the employer relies upon. As a result, employers would be incentivized to 
take every countermeasure possible to combat algorithmic discrimination, 
and the theory would not let them off the hook if they understood that, despite 
those countermeasures, there was still a substantial risk of the algorithm they 
used being discriminatory. There would still be obstacles to plaintiffs 
discerning the information required to bring a claim, but supplementing this 
theory with Professor Kim’s proposals to make discovery more accessible196 
could enable plaintiffs to hold parties whose algorithms discriminate against 
them responsible. 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that employment discrimination 
law is not toothless in the face of algorithmic advertising discrimination, 
provided that corporations like Facebook are found to be employment 
 
 189 See supra Section I.C.1. 
 190 Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 187, at 18. 
 191 Bornstein, supra note 183, at 1096. 
 192 See, e.g., Zhang et al., supra note 54, at 335. 
 193 Settlement, supra note 16, at 1. 
 194 Bornstein, supra note 183, at 1103–07. 
 195 See supra Section II.B. 
 196 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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agencies for purposes of Title VII when they target job ads to individual 
users. Professor Kroll and his colleagues show how requiring the users of 
algorithms to generate explanations for their algorithms’ decisions can 
provide sufficient information to allow Title VII plaintiffs to bring actions to 
counter employment discrimination.197 Professor Kim, in turn, explains how 
disparate impact actions can adapt to the challenges posed by DLNNs by 
loosening discovery requirements and allowing plaintiffs to state claims 
based on pure disparate impact without allowing the defense that the 
algorithm is making decisions reasonably related to future employment 
performance.198 And Professor Bornstein’s theory of reckless discrimination 
would allow courts to hold employers and employment agencies like 
Facebook liable for their discriminatory algorithms, despite any claims of 
business necessity, if those businesses have not taken all steps reasonably 
possible to mitigate the possibility of such discrimination.199 
IV. COUNTERING ALGORITHMIC DISCRIMINATION REACTIVELY AND 
PREVENTATIVELY 
The question remains whether the adaptations described in the previous 
Part, and the threat of litigation under such claims, suffice to address 
algorithmic employment discrimination. If the goal of employment 
discrimination law is to give recourse to aggrieved parties, then these 
adaptations may be enough. But if employment discrimination law exists to 
prevent employment discrimination from occurring,200 it remains to be seen 
whether litigation will achieve this goal. 
This Part concludes that, although these adaptations may provide relief 
to individual plaintiffs and even classes of plaintiffs, they are insufficient to 
adequately prevent such discrimination from occurring in the first place.201 
Litigation is fundamentally a reactive solution, which prevents undesirable 
behavior through deterrence.202 But because even maximally deterred ML 
developers may be unable to prevent their systems from discriminating, 
 
 197 Kroll et al., supra note 29, at 696–99. 
 198 Kim, supra note 150, at 917–20. 
 199 Bornstein, supra note 183, at 1103. 
 200 The fact that Title VII defines a wide range of discriminatory employment behaviors as unlawful 
suggests that the law is designed to prevent such discrimination, not only provide redress for it.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 201 See infra Section IV.A. 
 202 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 93 (2004) 
(“[F]inancial incentives [can] reduce harmful externalities. Under a liability rule, parties who suffer harm 
can bring suit against injurers and obtain compensation for their losses, motivating injurers to avoid 
causing harm.”). 
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preventing algorithmic discrimination by DLNNs requires a proactive 
solution.203 Specifically, the most effective way to prevent an ML system 
from learning the wrong thing is to train it on a sufficiently large and diverse 
dataset such that random biasing patterns are less likely to appear in that 
dataset.204 In order to use techniques like bias mitigation, this dataset must 
contain extensive private information about individuals and their protected 
characteristics. 
This Note proposes a proactive solution, allowing ML engineers to train 
their systems on a large, rich, diverse dataset of real people’s data.205 Because 
the existence of such a dataset poses serious privacy concerns for the people 
whose data are included in it, this data should not be publicly available, nor 
should it simply be given to engineers training ML systems. Instead, some 
specialized third party, such as a nonprofit organization, an industry 
consortium, a public–private venture, or a new government agency, should 
be tasked with maintaining and safeguarding this dataset and with testing 
systems against this dataset for bias. 
A. The Insufficiency of Reactive Solutions 
Although reckless discrimination provides the most promising path 
forward for challenging algorithmic discrimination under Title VII, all the 
theories discussed above are valuable contributions which, if followed, 
would almost certainly make it easier to challenge algorithmic 
discrimination in the courts.206 Courts should look to these proposed 
solutions as ways to address antidiscrimination litigation currently moving 
through the legal system and the cases that will be brought in the near 
future.207 
But ultimately, the question remains whether adaptations that focus on 
how to recognize and challenge algorithmic discrimination in court would 
only treat the symptoms of algorithmic bias rather than seek to cure it. A 
credible threat of successful litigation may well be enough to induce DLNN 
engineers to implement techniques like bias mitigation, or other techniques 
that might be developed to reduce the potential for discriminatory bias. But 
 
 203 See infra Section IV.A. Kroll and colleagues agree that designing for antidiscrimination must be 
a component of algorithmic development but conclude that legal mechanisms beyond the threat of 
litigation are unnecessary. See Kroll et al., supra note 29, at 694–95. 
 204 See supra Section I.C.1. 
 205 See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 206 See supra Part III. 
 207 See, e.g., supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing HUD’s recently filed action against 
Facebook). 
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the discussion in Part I of this Note presents a hard truth: no matter the 
intentions of a DLNN’s engineers or the steps taken to prevent such systems 
from discriminating, they will not know what their system is doing until it is 
deployed on extensive real-world data.208 Because of this, once the DLNN 
system has been trained and deployed, it can be too late to fix the problems 
it may create.209 
Thus, the threat of litigation is insufficient to fix the problem. Litigation 
may incentivize engineers to take every step possible to mitigate the risk of 
discrimination, but these may not be enough to actually avoid that 
discrimination if their systems are trained on data insufficiently rich to allow 
their systems to learn a useful function without learning a discriminatory 
one.210 It is unrealistic to demand that every company build its own 
sufficiently large, reliable datasets, as doing so involves enormous human 
capital costs.211 
Furthermore, when a plaintiff prevails in her case, it is not clear what 
should happen next. Will the system that had been found to discriminate 
against that particular plaintiff be allowed to continue to be used on others? 
Should the company that created the system be required to scrap it entirely 
and start over, potentially at enormous cost to their business? Both options 
have obvious shortcomings. And unless the company was prevented from 
using DLNNs at all, there would be no mechanism to ensure that whatever 
system would subsequently be put into use would not discriminate against 
other people as well. 
Forbidding companies from using DLNNs in employment contexts, or 
other contexts in which discrimination is a concern, would be a repudiation 
of progress and technological development and likely significant overkill. 
Instead, if we want to go beyond giving recourse to individual plaintiffs who 
have the time and resources to pursue a claim against corporations like 
Facebook and to develop a legal mechanism designed to prevent such 
 
 208 See supra Section I.C.1. 
 209 Even if the system can be pulled before it does any harm, the system’s engineers would have to 
retrain and redeploy the system on whatever new data they gathered—an expensive and time-consuming 
process, with no guarantee that the updated system would be significantly better or would not have to be 
immediately pulled again. Demanding that businesses repeatedly shoulder these costs is unrealistic and 
unfair. See supra Section I.C.1; see also Turney, supra note 81, at 4–5. 
 210 See supra Section I.C. 
 211 See Turney, supra note 81, at 3; Gary M. Weiss & Foster Provost, Learning when Training Data 
Are Costly: The Effect of Class Distribution on Tree Induction, 19 J. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RES. 315, 
315 (2003). Requiring companies to build their own datasets or go find one put together by someone else 
increases the risk of poisoning attacks. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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discrimination from occurring in the first place, those legal mechanisms must 
be proactive rather than reactive.212 
B. Proactive Solutions 
This Section examines recently proposed legislation designed to vet 
ML systems before their deployment. It then proposes a new path forward 
for countering algorithmic discrimination: an organization charged first with 
creating and maintaining a dataset sufficiently representative of the general 
population that ML systems trained upon it are less likely to be 
discriminatory, and second with monitoring and verifying the performance 
of those same ML systems. 
1. The Algorithmic Accountability Act 
Legislation was recently introduced in Congress to create a mechanism 
to vet artificial intelligence systems prior to their being rolled out to 
customers (and to retroactively vet already-deployed systems).213 This Bill, 
the Algorithmic Accountability Act (the Act), would give the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) authority to issue rules and regulations regarding the 
development of certain artificial intelligence systems, set standards for 
unacceptable levels of unfairness, discrimination, or data vulnerability in 
those systems, and provide some oversight over system developers.214 The 
Act does not define what would count as unfair or discriminatory outcomes 
caused by the regulated systems, nor what would be required to remediate 
them, leaving those determinations to the FTC in its rulemaking capacity.215 
But the Act would, at a minimum, require certain entities—those that 
produce certain kinds of artificial intelligence systems—to also produce 
 
 212 The reader may think that this Note is simply restating the proposed solution of Kroll et al., see 
supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text. Not so. It certainly agrees with Kroll and his colleagues 
that the solution to the problem of discriminatory algorithms requires the algorithms to be built properly 
in the first place. But whereas Kroll and his colleagues appear to argue that system engineers may well 
take all appropriate steps themselves, Kroll et al., supra note 29 at 694–95, this Note argues that they 
must be compelled to do so. Kroll and his colleagues also appear to believe that Title VII litigation 
requires no adaptation for plaintiffs aggrieved by algorithms, id., a position with which this Note 
disagrees. Most importantly, Kroll and his colleagues do not address the fact that to build the kinds of 
antidiscriminatory ML systems that they—and this Note—want engineers to build, those engineers need 
access to a larger and richer database than they are likely to have access to. It is the need for access to 
such a database that leads this Note to conclude that some third-party entity is needed. See infra Section 
IV.B.2. 
 213 Algorithmic Accountability Act, S. 1108, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 214 Id. § 3(b)(1). 
 215 Id. 
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reports to the FTC.216 Those reports are to assess the systems’ risks and 
benefits, and to take whatever remedial steps the FTC deems necessary to 
remedy the problems the reports identify.217 
The Act is a good start, aimed as it is at catching and preventing the 
harmful outcomes that such systems might create before they come to pass.218 
But ultimately, although the Act could significantly improve upon the status 
quo, it appears insufficient to consistently prevent the discriminatory 
outcomes described herein from occurring. As an initial matter, the Act only 
covers entities that make more than $50 million in annual revenue, have 
more than a million users’ personal information, or act as data brokers.219 By 
defining covered entities by what they have rather than by what they do, the 
Act would permit a small company to develop a discriminatory system with 
wide-reaching effects so long as the company maintains less than $50 million 
in revenue, trains its system on fewer than one million users’ data, and 
doesn’t sell that data to others. Furthermore, the Act requires those entities 
to assess and report on their own system rather than having outsiders evaluate 
them and does not mandate that the systems be tested on new data.220 As 
described above, developers may be unaware that their systems discriminate 
until those systems are deployed and operate upon new data, limiting the 
value and effectiveness of such self-reporting.221 
And therein lies the rub. Although the Act, by establishing a proactive 
assessment system, improves upon the purely reactive options, it leaves the 
FTC with the same limited options a court would have when confronted with 
a discriminatory system whose developers took every step possible to avoid 
having their system discriminate.222 Like a court, the FTC could either allow 
that system to be deployed in full or block it entirely; there is no mechanism 
to support the developer’s efforts to make a nondiscriminatory system in the 
first place. And once again, if a system’s developer has a limited or biased 
 
 216 Id. § 2(5) (covered entities include those with over $50 million in annual revenue, those with over 
one million users’ personal information, and data brokers). 
 217 Id. §§ 2(2), 2(5), 3(b)(1). The Act is extremely thorough in its definition of the risks such systems 
can pose. Id. §§ 2(7)–(8). 
 218 Of course, it is difficult to know how effective the Act would be until the FTC released regulations 
giving it effect; if the FTC decides that addressing an identified problem involves little more than an 
ineffective disclaimer, the Act would have little effect. 
 219 S. 1108 § 2(5). 
 220 Id. § 3(b)(1). The Act does “require each covered entity to conduct the impact assessments . . . , 
if reasonably possible, in consultation with external third parties . . . .” Id. § 3(b)(1)(C). It is unclear how 
“if reasonably possible” would interact with, for example, trade secret laws. 
 221 See supra Section I.C. 
 222 Supra Section I.A. 
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dataset with which to train the algorithm, there may be nothing that 
developer can do to avoid creating a biased algorithm.223 
2. The Right Dataset in the Right Hands 
If ML systems are to be prevented from discriminating, such systems 
must be trained on enormous and representative datasets that, to the greatest 
extent possible, do not encode forbidden biases that the systems can pick up 
on.224 These datasets must include variables upon which it is forbidden for 
systems to discriminate (such as sex, race, religion, etc.)—variables which 
the engineers of these systems may well not have access to, and which the 
end-users of the systems may be extremely loath to provide to those 
engineers.225 These datasets must contain real human data since artificial data 
is unlikely to replicate the many patterns latent therein.226 And these systems 
will have to be tested on yet another enormous, representative dataset, to 
ensure that the system did not, in fact, learn a discriminatory algorithm, nor 
did it learn a function to “finesse” the particular dataset it trained upon—the 
equivalent of “teaching for the test.”227 If the creators of these systems have 
access to this latter dataset as they train their systems, the purposes of 
keeping the testing dataset separate will be undermined as the creators may 
be able to use this testing dataset during training.228 Thus, regardless of where 
developers get their training data, the test data must be managed by some 
third party. 
The only feasible, long-term solution to these challenges is the creation 
of an external organization—which, for clarity, this Note will call “the 
Recordkeeper”—that can manage both a training and a testing database229 of 
real human data and make them available to ML engineers for training and 
testing, while not actually exposing those engineers to the private 
information contained therein. Because the data must be representative of 
the entire underlying population and will include extensive private 
 
 223 Supra Section I.C.1. 
 224 See supra Section I.C.1. One source of algorithmic bias is the plethora of functions that can 
explain the data. The larger and richer the dataset, the fewer such functions there will be. 
 225 See supra Section I.C.2. 
 226 See, e.g., John Murray, Training AI with Fake Data: A Flawed Solution?, BINARY DISTRICT  
(Oct. 8, 2018), https://journal.binarydistrict.com/can-you-spot-a-fake-training-machine-learning-
algorithms-with-synthetic-data [https://perma.cc/KFV7-H37V]. 
 227 See supra Section I.C.1. 
 228 Domingos, supra note 51, at 80. 
 229 In practice, there would likely be a single database that could be carved into different training and 
testing portions each time such datasets were needed. See id. 
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information, the best way to gather it may be simply to pay people a small 
amount to voluntarily participate and provide their data.230 
The Recordkeeper ought to make this data available for system 
developers to train on, not just to test on, for several practical considerations. 
First, in order to avoid building discriminatory systems, developers will need 
access to such a dataset anyways. Assembling it will be enormously time-, 
resource-, and labor-intensive, so it makes sense to have all interested parties 
share in those costs rather than to have each redundantly bear them. Although 
a company like Facebook might be able to bear such costs, less wealthy 
actors might be prevented from entering the marketplace if they cannot 
afford to assemble their own. Furthermore, by definition a single, highly 
secured repository of information is more secure than multiple copies held 
by many different actors, which is only as secure as its least secure copy. 
Finally, these databases will include private information about the 
people represented in them, including information regarding protected 
characteristics, both to enable bias mitigation training and to detect bias 
when it manifests. Because of the sensitivity of this information, access to 
these databases should be as restricted as possible; the datasets should serve 
as black-box training grounds that Facebook and others can access only for 
training and testing purposes, without ever accessing the information itself. 
The Recordkeeper itself should not be able to examine the data beyond what 
is necessary to build and maintain the system, nor should it be permitted to 
share the data with anyone else, including the government.231 Instead, these 
datasets could be made available to system engineers one datum at a time for 
use in training and testing, encrypted such that the data could not be copied 
by those engineers. Or the Recordkeeper could be charged with developing 
 
 230 Any law mandating that individuals must share the highly sensitive personal data discussed herein 
might be found unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because people have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in such data. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–90 (2014) 
(holding that a person’s cell phone cannot be searched without a warrant partly because it can contain 
“[t]he sum of an individual’s private life”). Such data could conceivably be collected through use of 
administrative warrants. See Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) 
(holding that, in certain administrative contexts, “‘probable cause’ to issue a warrant to [search] must 
exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting [that search] are satisfied”). 
Significant political opposition could be expected if the government sought to mandate disclosure of such 
private data. See, e.g., Michael Price & Faiza Patel, Muslim Registry or NSEERS Reboot Would Be 
Unconstitutional, LAWFARE (Nov. 22, 2016, 12:45 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/muslim-registry-
or-nseers-reboot-would-be-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/X336-CYEF]. This Note therefore instead 
proposes getting people to opt-in to such a system with financial incentives and by motivating them to be 
a part of combating algorithmic discrimination. 
 231 The data should be used only for the purposes described herein because people may be unlikely 
to volunteer such information about themselves if they think it will be shared, either with third parties or 
the government. 
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training environments that allowed the data to be transferred to engineers’ 
systems for training, but in a sufficiently controlled fashion that siphoning 
off of or access to the data for anything other than training purposes could 
be detected.232 By making a dedicated Recordkeeper responsible for 
collecting and managing the database, companies would never need to solicit 
information on protected characteristics from their customers just to ensure 
they are not discriminating against them.233 
In addition to managing these databases, the Recordkeeper would be 
responsible for ensuring that system engineers use all appropriate state-of-
the-art techniques to avoid training discriminatory systems, such as bias 
mitigation. And the Recordkeeper would be charged with verifying that the 
resulting systems did not discriminate along protected characteristics, giving 
engineers opportunities to retrain their systems before deployment if 
necessary. Where systems cannot be made to operate in a non-discriminatory 
fashion, the Recordkeeper would have the capacity and responsibility to 
detect that defect and prevent the system from being deployed. 
This hypothetical Recordkeeper would be best realized as a new AI-
focused government agency, which would maintain these databases, 
interface with the corporations that will use them, and evaluate the ML 
systems they develop.234 This agency could ensure that the best possible 
datasets were being used and that engineers were taking every appropriate 
step available to them to counter the risk of discriminatory algorithms. 
Importantly, this solution would not necessarily forbid the deployment of 
algorithms that may be biased; it would only ensure that all appropriate steps 
were taken to mitigate the risk of their being biased in a way humans are not 
 
 232 Though outside the scope of this Note, researchers have been developing techniques to train ML 
systems without exposing the data they are trained upon. See, e.g., Martín Abadi et al., Deep Learning 
with Differential Privacy, 2016 PROC. ACM SIGSAC CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 308, 
308–09. 
 233 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 234 This Note is not the first piece of scholarship to propose an agency dedicated to regulating ML 
systems. See generally Andrew Tutt, An FDA For Algorithms, 69 ADMIN L. REV. 83 (2016) (arguing that 
the problem of machine bias is sufficiently pervasive in ML systems and can be expected to arise in 
sufficiently varied contexts that having an agency with expertise dedicated to promulgating standards for 
detecting and addressing such bias may be desirable). Tutt’s argument holds especially true if detecting 
such bias requires a test set of private information against which to verify the system’s performance: the 
less disseminated such a dataset would be, the better. 
 This Note goes further than Tutt in calling for such an agency to maintain the kind of database that is 
necessary to avoid creating such biased systems. Furthermore, while, like Tutt, this Note favors a 
government agency due to the government’s accountability to its people, the Recordkeeper need not be a 
government agency; a nonprofit, public–private venture, or even industry consortium could fill this role. 
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permitted to be and would seek to understand how exactly these algorithms 
are biased. 
Several criticisms of this proposal could be raised. The first concerns 
feasibility and enforceability: the creation of a new agency is too costly and 
presents an unrealistic goal, and any non-governmental solution will simply 
be ignored. But after start-up costs to gather the initial datasets and create the 
necessary technological infrastructure (including security infrastructure), the 
Recordkeeper could raise the funds necessary to manage itself and to keep 
its dataset current by charging fees to those who use it.235 As for non-
governmental Recordkeepers, companies might wish to signal to consumers 
that they worked to debias their systems, much as building developers tout 
LEED certification.236 Regardless, this Note aims to describe a long-term 
solution to the problem of algorithmic discrimination; practical details of 
exactly how a Recordkeeper would be structured and funded fall outside its 
scope. 
A second criticism is that to take this proposal to its extreme is 
tantamount to outlawing DLNNs, despite this Note’s assurances to the 
contrary. But that would only be true if it were entirely impossible or 
unfeasible to mitigate the risks that such systems will discriminate. The work 
on bias mitigation and related areas indicates that such fears are misguided.237 
And the solution this Note calls for does not forbid the deployment of biased 
systems so long as every reasonable step was taken to avoid having that 
system be biased, meaning that such systems comport with, at minimum, the 
standards to which a human would be held. 
Critics may note that ML system developers often have specialized data 
their systems must train upon, and the Recordkeeper’s dataset will not 
include those data. But if the people whose data comprise the dataset provide 
that information voluntarily and for compensation, the developers can pay 
those same people to provide the specialized data the developers need to train 
their system, or conversely the developers can encourage the people whose 
data they already have to sign up with the Recordkeeper. If this transaction 
occurs with the Recordkeeper as an intermediary, the developers need not 
 
 235 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REPORT NO. 775, USER-
FEE FINANCING OF USDA MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION 6 (1999) (“Many Federal agencies now rely 
on user fees for at least some funding, and the importance of user fees as a source of funding has grown 
sharply in recent years.”). 
 236 See, e.g., Daniel C. Matisoff et al., Performance or Marketing Benefits? The Case of LEED 
Certification, 48 ENV. SCI. & TECH. 2001, 2001 (2014) (discussing the importance of marketing-based 
benefits brought by Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)-certified buildings because 
they indicate a building is “green”). 
 237 See supra Section I.C.2. 
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necessarily even know who those people are, and certainly need not access 
any of the private information about those people held by the Recordkeeper. 
Finally and unfortunately, this solution would not necessarily address 
the problem of datasets encoding the systematic human and societal biases 
that shape their data. This is a separate problem entirely.238 But at least a 
large, representative dataset is unlikely to encode random bias artifacts that 
may appear in smaller datasets and will be less vulnerable to malicious actors 
manipulating the dataset to encode those actors’ own biases. While 
concededly not a panacea, this Note’s proposal thus represents a significant 
improvement over the status quo. 
In the advertising domain in particular, there is a simple economic 
argument for requiring companies like Facebook to prove that their 
advertising systems are not discriminatory before deploying them. Unlike 
hiring decisions, advertising decisions are relatively low cost. Advertisers 
may pay a flat fee for the ad, plus a small amount per click.239 Therefore, it 
is fairly cheap to display an employment ad to additional people who may, 
in the end, not be qualified to perform the job in question. This low cost of 
compliance suggests that the standard for justifying disparate treatment of 
protected groups should be as strict as possible and should be imposed on 
both the ad platform (e.g., Facebook) and the advertiser.240 The advertiser 
will lose only the money from paying for clicks by unqualified people; 
Facebook will lose only money from showing ads to people who do not click 
them (thereby losing the revenue Facebook would gain from showing users 
ads they would click). These costs are extremely low relative to those 
involved in interviewing and possibly hiring the wrong candidates. Most 
importantly, this will preserve everyone’s incentives to accurately predict 
who will be interested in and qualified for an advertised job opportunity 
while ensuring that ads are not placed in a discriminatory fashion. Such a 
model will incentivize employers to provide useful nondiscriminatory 
characteristics to Facebook, and will incentive Facebook only to expand the 
pool of targeted users to those who will click the ad. 
In summary, because preventing algorithmic discrimination requires a 
proactive solution, this Note proposes the creation of a Recordkeeper, an 
institution to assemble, manage, and put to use a large, rich, representative 
dataset of real human data. The Recordkeeper would allow ML developers 
limited and controlled access to that data, would audit those systems to 
 
 238 See, e.g., Angwin et al., supra note 61. 
 239 Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 11 ACM QUEUE 1, 7 (2013). 
 240 SHAVELL, supra note 202, at 180. 
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ensure appropriate steps were taken to avoid learning biased functions, and 
would verify that their performance is as unbiased as possible. 
CONCLUSION 
Machine learning techniques, especially deep learning neural networks, 
pose new challenges for employment discrimination and other forms of 
discrimination. Employment discrimination law as it currently operates is ill-
equipped to deal with the challenges posed by such systems. Nonetheless, 
scholars have proposed adaptations to the legal landscape to allow plaintiffs 
to bring lawsuits when they have been discriminated against by biased 
algorithms. But because of how DLNNs work, fixing employment 
discrimination litigation is unlikely to prevent such discrimination from 
occurring in the first place. The best chance at preventing discrimination is 
to ensure that DLNNs are trained on a large, representative dataset and 
precleared by an organization with expertise before they are deployed onto 
unsuspecting users. 
The solution called for herein is ambitious. Even the reactive changes 
that courts could take without the legislative action called for will likely meet 
with resistance. The Supreme Court has been reticent to overly expand 
access to claims based on disparate impact, arguing that “disparate-impact 
liability must be limited so employers and other regulated entities are able to 
make the practical business choices and profit-related decisions that sustain 
a vibrant and dynamic free-enterprise system.”241 And the regulated parties 
themselves can be expected to resist such changes. Employers would rather 
only target ads to the people they think are most likely to qualify for the job, 
even if such people are defined on the basis of a protected characteristic; 
advertising platforms don’t want to open their systems up for inspection. 
But big data and machine learning-based decision-making are here to 
stay. They pervade every part of our lives and society.242 These systems are 
fundamentally new in that they defy inspection, explanation, and 
 
 241 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Proj. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2015). 
 242 A version of the problems this Note has described will be presented by nearly any automated ML 
system that operates in the real world. Self-driving cars must accurately analyze their surroundings, 
systems like IBM’s Watson are already making and will increasingly make business and healthcare 
analyses and recommendations, automated messaging centers must understand and accurately respond to 
callers regardless of accent or dialect, image-labeling systems may be trained extensively on images of 
people of one race and thus perform poorly on images of people of another race, to say nothing of hiring 
systems, credit rating systems, surveillance systems, and more. This warning is not to be alarmist—it is 
wonderful that these systems will alleviate human workload burdens, never get upset, and never suffer 
attentional lapses. But these systems are only as good as their design and their training data. Ensuring 
their training data is truly representative of the world in which the systems will operate and that they are 
designed to anticipate and overcome the pitfalls that may face them will be one of the main projects of 
the twenty-first century. 
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comprehension, at least beyond examining the data upon which, and the 
manner in which, the algorithms are trained. Just as the rise of 
industrialization required a new legal doctrine that is now widely accepted 
and part of the fabric of our legal lives (that is, principles of strict product 
liability), so too the rise of big-data algorithmic decision-making will require 
the legal system to address inscrutable decisions based on extrapolating 
patterns and data. These decisions are made without intent and defy careful 
causal analysis: they are something new under the sun. If we do not adapt 
our legal systems to them, we may be able to react on a case-by-case basis 
to their discrimination but will fail to prevent such discrimination from 
occurring in the first place. The algorithms will search for their signals, and 
the law will be lost in the noise. 
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